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NOTES
COMMON LAW PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS' RIGHTS
IN PERSONAL INFORMATION
William J. Fenrich
INTRODUCrlON

As you live your life you leave an explicit and revealing trail of
electronic footprints.' Simply by being born;2 getting married;3 having
a child;4 or dying; 5 purchasing something with a check or a credit
card;6 subscribing to a magazine;7 calling an 800 or 900 number.' using
1. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standardsfor Fair Information Practicein the
U.S. Private Sector, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 497, 517 (1995) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Setting
Standards] (describing how the direct marketing industry collects "discrete bits of personal information from many sources"); Michael W. Miller, Hot Lists: Data Mills
Delve Deep to Find InformationAbout U.S. Consumers: Folks Inadvertently Supply It
by Buying Cars, Mailing Coupons, Moving Dying, Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1991, at Al
("You go through life dropping little bits of data about yourself everywhere.... Most
people don't know that there are big vacuum cleaners sucking it up." (quoting privacy
advocate Evan Hendricks, editor of Privacy Tunes, a Washington, D.C., monthly));
Mary Zahn & Eldon Knoche, Electronic Footprints: Yours Are a Lot Easier to Track
Than You May Think, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Jan. 16, 1995, at 1A. Zahn and Knoche
describe the results of their findings as follows:
Write a check and somewhere a computer may log in your name. Buy an
expensive dinner with a credit card and a databank may register you as an
upscale consumer. Apply for a driver's license and anyone with a few bucks
can know your age and address. Send for a video and someone will know
your taste in movies. Use a discount card at a supermarket and the can of
tuna fish you bought leaves an electronic fingerprint. Even breathing can be
a spectator sport for your medical records may end up in a Boston information bank. As you are born, go to school, get a job, have a family, raise your
kids, retire and die, nearly everywhere you go and everything you do leaves
computer footprints behind. And in some cases, governmental agencies.
which you probably thought would be sympathetic to protecting your privacy, work hand in hand with these merchants by making available to them
intimate facts about your life. And it's all legal.
Id.
2. Zahn & Knoche, supra note 1, at 1A.
3. Miller, supra note 1, at A8.
4. See id. (noting marketing efforts targeted at women intending to have children); R.J. Ignelzi, Mail and Telejunk: U.S. Marketers Have Your Number: Your Age
and Shoe Size, Too, San Diego Union-Trib., July 4, 1995, at El.
5. See Miller, supra note 1, at A8 (noting statement by president of marketing
firm that collects information on recent deaths, who stated that "fd]eath has always
been a negative life style change nobody thought could be sold, but I differ... I think
it's a very good market").
6. Zahn & Knoche, supra note 1, at 1A.
7. See Avrahami v. U.S. News & World Rep., Inc., No. 96-203, slip op. at 10-11
(Cir. Ct. Arlington County June 13, 1996).
8. Zahn & Knoche, supra note 1, at 1A.
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a discount card at a supermarket; 9 or applying for a driver's license;' °
you leave a record of where you were and what you did, and the
holder of that record is free to do with it whatever he or she pleases.
These transactional footprints have value because they can provide
businesses a glimpse of your life that might indicate your receptiveness to products or services these businesses offer." While each record has some individual value, the information develops its greatest
value, and greatest power, when the individual pieces are gathered
and layered on top of one another, creating a detailed profile of who
you are and what you do. 2 This "personality profile"' allows marketing companies to make numerous assumptions about your interests
and spending habits, thereby enhancing these marketers' ability to target solicitations to those people most inclined to respond.' 4 As a result, you would inevitably find yourself categorized on one or more of
the thousands of lists that are bought, rented, or sold each day.' 5 This
is particularly true of persons meeting certain identifiable and sensi-

9. Id
10. Id.For a discussion of state sales of driver registration records, see infra notes
55-58 and accompanying text.
11. These discrete bits of information are traded widely among catalog and magazine publishers. For example, on the assumption that subscribers to U.S. News &
World Report might be inclined to subscribe to Smithsonian magazine, the latter
rented from the former a list of the names and addresses of U.S. News subscribers.
This activity spawned a lawsuit by a U.S. News subscriber who argued that U.S. News
unlawfully appropriated his name and likeness for commercial gain. See Avrahami,
No. 96-203, slip op. at 7-8. For a more detailed discussion of the Avrahami case, see
infra notes 291-97 and accompanying text.
12. See Zahn & Knoche, supra note 1, at 1A ("Bits of personal and financial facts
about you, valuable in individual pieces, become more profitable as chunks of data
are overlaid on each other. Layers and layers of easily acquired information are
merged into a profile that is treasured by magazines, car dealerships, banks, insurance
companies and anyone else who wants to market a product to you or determine that
you are a poor health or credit risk."); see also Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra
note 1, at 516-23 (detailing the profiling techniques employed by direct marketing
companies); Jonathan Berry, Database Marketing: A Potent Tool for Selling, Bus.
Wk., Sept. 5, 1994 at 56 (describing how information is collected and combined "into
the database maw" to generate complex profiles of consumers and their interests).
13. "Personality profiles" are those records, lists, or representations that combine
multiple pieces of personal information about a given "data subject." See Reidenberg,
Setting Standards, supra note 1, at 517 ("By cross-referencing numerous items of personal information, individual profiles are developed. These profiles may consist of a
single characteristic, such as subscribers to Penthouse or denture adhesive buyers.
They may also consist of a more complete set of characteristics."). A "data subject" is
merely the individual whose personal information is gathered. See infra note 18 (detailing legislative proposals that define "data subject").
14. Zahn & Knoche, supra note 1, at 1A.
15. At least 10,000 lists of data about individuals are available for rent. National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, Inquiry on Privacy Issues Relating to Private Sector Use of Telecommunications-Related Personal Information, 59
Fed. Reg. 6842, 6842 (1994) [hereinafter NTIA Inquiry].
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16
The breadth and specificity of these lists can be
five characteristics.
7

astounding.'

Many Americans believe these practices to infringe upon their right
to privacy. Recent cases demonstrate the scope and type of privacy
violations emanating from unauthorized dissemination of personal information.' 8 In one case, a woman from Burbank, California ordered
16. Zahn & Knoche, supra note 1, at 1A ("Troubling to many is the sale of lists of
people who meet sensitive and personal criteria. Any lesbian or a diabetic has a good
chance of being on a list. A Jew has an excellent chance of making some marketing
list.").
According to a former head of a Federal commission charged with investigating
personal privacy concerns, "[w]ithout our knowledge we are profiled and placed on
many specialized lists, whether we like it or not. ... You could be classified as a
foreign policy hawk, affluent ethnic professional, black activist, person who frequents
the dice table. You don't know what lists you are on." Id (quoting David F. Linowes,
former chairman of the U.S. Privacy Protection Study Commission).
17. For example, lists including the names of the following Americans have been
sold by list brokers: more than 300,000 men who called various 8001900 phone fantasy
numbers; 55,912 gay and lesbian magazine subscribers; 5000 women who responded
to an 800 phone number offering information and samples of adult diapers (this list
sold for $270); and 82,000 men 55 and older who sought help for impotency at a
medical clinic. Id
Additionally, one company, which deems itself the world's leading broker and manager of Jewish lists, claims it "can identify and mail to 85% of the 2.6 million Jewish
households in the United States." 1d As the authors of this newspaper article note,
"[g]enerally, these lists are rented for one-time use only by list brokers who are the
real estate agents of the information industry." ld
18. For the purposes of this Note, "personal information" is information that in
any way concerns or reflects the personality of an individual. A similar definition is
"information ...gathered, stored, or disseminated in ways that make likely its association with particular individuals." Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law,
§§ 15-17, at 967 (1978).
The scope of the definition is not as important as whether the information has value
to those who seek to appropriate it. California has a statute that regulates governmental collection, transmission, and sale of personal information. Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1798.3 (West. Supp. 1996). While this Note concerns trade by private parties of
personal information, California's definition helps delineate the possible scope of the
definition. It reads:
The term "personal information" means any information that is maintained
by an agency that identifies or describes an individual, including, but not
limited to, his or her name, social security number, physical description,
home address, home telephone number, education, financial matters, and
medical or employment history. It includes statements made by, or attributed to, the individual.
Id
Additionally, the statute exempts from its scope dissemination of newsworthy information: "The term 'commercial purpose' means any purpose which has financial gain
as a major objective. It does not include the gathering or dissemination of newsworthy facts by a publisher or broadcaster." Id. § 1798.3().
A broader definition proposed by the European Community includes "any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject')." James
R. Maxeiner, Business Information and "PersonalData": Some Common-Lmv Observations About the EU DraftData ProtectionDirective, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 619, 619 & n.1
(1995) (citing Article 2(a) of the Commission of the European Communities
"Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals with
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a maternity catalog after she became pregnant.' 9 Not surprisingly, she
was soon bombarded with "more catalogs, baby-product samples, calls
from baby photographers and diaper services. ' 20 There was one problem with these offers, however: the woman's pregnancy ended with a
miscarriage. She made repeated phone calls requesting that the product manufacturers stop soliciting her.2 ' When she explained to the
telephone solicitors what had happened to her pregnancy, they often
hung-up on her. Her requests unheeded, the solicitations continued,
and included birthday wishes and baby product offers which reminded
the woman of her lost pregnancy.' She became so upset that her husband had to open all of the mail and answer all phone calls to the
house. Finally, after almost two years of unanswered requests, she
sent a letter to all the solicitors, as well as to the major list brokers,
explaining what had happened and threatening legal action if the3 solicitations did not cease. The "enticing offers" finally subsided.2
In another example, an eighty-three year-old woman was targeted
by marketers who learned from her purchases that she was elderly and
lived alone.24 Vulnerable to ostensibly "personal" calls from marketers who asked for her by name, the woman was induced to purchase
many items for which she had no use but was made to think she
needed.25

Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data"
of October 16, 1992, 1992 OJ. (C 311) 38).

An appropriate understanding of personal information is closer to the EC proposal,
i.e., any information relating to an identifiable person. In the case of the sale of a

magazine subscriber's name, for instance, the actual information that is sold is not
only the name and address, but also the subject's association with the seller. In this
instance, the information quite literally "relates" to the "identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject')."
19. Ignelzi, supra note 4, at El.
20. Id
21. Iad
22. Id
23. Id
24. Id
25. Id In another case, a woman and her husband, a police officer, worked hard
to keep their address secret. They were successful until the woman had her first child;
she was immediately inundated with marketing offers personally addressed to her. It
turns out that the hospital had sold her name and address to direct marketers on a list
of new mothers. Mark Lewyn, You Can Run, But It's Tough to Hide from Marketers,
Bus. Wk., Sept. 5, 1994, at 60.
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It seems that the only definite way to protect personal privacy 26 is to
leave no transactional trace as you live your life; 27 an exceedingly dif-

ficult task in a society becoming increasingly automated and computerized. 8 Indeed, most Americans would be surprised to learn the
scope of businesses' use of personal information. 29

But many Americans are aware of the increased unauthorized use
of personal information. Public opinion polls and privacy surveys
seem to indicate the widespread belief of many Americans that they
cannot control information about their personal lives. 3° Many persons
believe that they possess an innate right to control personal information,3 1 but also feel that they have lost the ability to control that information.32 Not surprisingly, most Americans seek to gain more control
over the dissemination of personal information.33
26. Most discussions of these issues take place under the vague rubric of "privacy." See Reidenberg, Setting Standards,supra note 1, at 498 (noting that "'[p]rivacy'
serves as a catch-all term"). Public discourse concerning businesses' dissemination of
personal information is usually couched in privacy terms. See e.g., Louis Harris &
Associates & Alan F. Westin, 1995 Equifax-Harris Mid-Decade Consumer Privacy
Survey (detailing results of survey monitoring consumer attitudes regarding privacy)
[hereinafter Equifax Survey]; Yankelovich Monitor, Yankelovich Monitor 1995 Consumer Privacy Survey (same) [hereinafter Yankelovich Survey].
27. One commentator proposes a viable, albeit drastic, strategy: "Pay cash. Avoid
credit. Don't sign up for government programs. Walk, don't drive. Live under a
rock. In short, for most ordinary people, there is no way [to] keep yourself off these
lists." Stephen Phillips, Never Mind Your Number-They've Got Your Name, Bus.
Wk., Sept. 4, 1989, at 81.
28. Jay Greene, Eluding Their Gaze: The Way to Protect PersonalInfo Is to Leave
No Trace But Remember - The Rules Aren't in Your Favor, Orange County Reg.,
Apr. 25, 1996, at Cl ("The idea of becoming a hermit may seem a bit rash. But as
Corporate America continues to whittle away at your privacy, the only way to protect
personal information is to leave no trace.").
29. "Most Americans have no idea of the scope of record-keeping ....

They

would be surprised at how easy it is for others to obtain information the individual
assumes is confidential." Zahn & Knoche, supra note 1, at lA (quoting statement
made to Congress by David F. Linowes, former chairman of the U.S. Privacy Protection Study Commission).
30. See Equifax Survey, supra note 26, at 17-33, 61 (detailing results of survey
monitoring consumer attitudes regarding privacy); Yankelovich Survey, supra note 26,
at 10-20.
Alan Westin, a professor at Columbia and author of an important book on privacy,
Privacy & Freedom (1967), consulted on the Equifax survey. He concluded that the
survey results indicated strong concern about the use and dissemination of personal
information. Equifax Survey, supra note 26, at 9.
31. See J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer and the Right of Publicity: A
Tribute, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1703, 1711 (1987) ("[Nlothing is so strongly intuited as the
notion that my identity is mine - it is my property, to control as I see fit.").
32. See Equifax Survey, supra note 26, at 23 ("The vast majority of Americans
(80%) agree that 'consumers have lost all control over how personal information
about them is circulated and used by companies."'); Yankelovich Survey, supra note
26, at 18 (noting that Americans are feeling more protective of their privacy in 1995
than they did in the early 1990s).
33. See Claudia Montague, PrivateAyes, Marketing Tools Magazine, Jan. 1996, at
1 (citing "alarming" figures in Yankelovich survey suggesting that nine out of ten
Americans favor legislation to regulate business use of consumer information).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

In contrast to the concerns of these individuals lie the interests of
the direct marketing industry. Some estimates find that direct marketing in 1995 led to as much as $600 billion in sales of goods and services,' and employed over eighteen million people.35 The annual
market for mailing lists alone, without factoring in sales attributable to
their use, has been estimated at approximately $3 billion.3 6 Additionally, the American Telemarketing Association asserts that telephone
salespeople made $159 billion in consumer sales in 1995. 37
The balance of power between the direct marketing industry and
the consumers upon whose information it depends is currently tilted
strongly in favor of the marketers. Despite the apparent public concern over unauthorized uses of personal information, it remains legal
to disseminate personal information without first obtaining the consent of the subject.38 Individuals currently have no right to be informed of the number, names, or types of lists that contain their
names, 39 nor do they have a right to have their names removed from
these lists.40 In fact, the direct marketing industry, 41 which has perhaps the largest stake in continued non-regulation of personal information sales, is not subject to any regulation at all.42
Against this backdrop of competing interests, attempts to vindicate
individuals' rights in personal information have been made in both
judicial and legislative forums. In the courts, as described in part IV,
34. See Robert J. Posch, The 25-Year Privacy Debate Has an InstitutionalMemory,
Direct Mkt., Apr. 1, 1996, 2 (citing estimates by the Direct Marketing Association
("DMA") that place the 1995 volume of sales generated by the direct marketing industry at $600 billion).
35. Julian Beltram, Homeowner's Suit over Junk Mail Turns Him into Folk Hero:
Payment Demandedfor Use of His Name, Vancouver Sun, Nov. 6, 1995, at A6 (estimating that 18.2 million persons are employed by the direct marketing industry).
36. NTIA Inquiry, supra note 15, at 6842.
37. Richard Higgins, Natick Consumer Fed Up at Being Dialed Up; Woman Spurs
Bill to Curb Sales of Phone, Address Lists, The Boston Globe, Sept. 1, 1996, at 1.
38. Greene, supra note 28, at C13 ("[R]ight now the deck is stacked in the favor of
businesses. Williams-Sonoma, for example, is under no obligation not to collect transactional data about what you buy and sell it to others." (quoting Christine Varney, a
commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission)).
39. Zahn & Knoche, supra note 1, at 1A ("Those lists are intended to help direct
marketers target customers. Legally, consumers do not have to give permission to
have their names sold, nor do they have to be notified of the lists they are on.").
40. See Privacy Protection Study Comm'n, Personal Privacy in an Information Society 147 (1977) [hereinafter Privacy Comm'n].
41. The direct marketing industry is represented in its lobbying efforts by the
DMA. Established in 1917, the DMA is the "oldest and largest trade association for
nonprofit and business organizations using direct marketing to reach their customers,
members, and prospects." Children's Privacy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) [hereinafter
Children'sPrivacy Hearings] (testimony of Richard A. Barton, Senior Vice-President
for Congressional Relations, Direct Marketing Association). The DMA represents
more than 3000 corporations and organizations in the United States and over 600
corporations in forty-seven other nations. iL
42. Reidenberg, Setting Standards,supra note 1, at 517.
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at least three cases have been brought claiming that the unauthorized
sale of consumer information violates the appropriation tort.4 3 Not
one has been successful.
In addition to these judicial attempts, many commentators have advocated legislation that would grant individuals legal rights in their
personal information." These commentators argue that the legislature is better equipped than a court to establish such a right, which
would require that any person or institution must obtain the affirmative consent of a data-subject before disseminating to third-parties

that data-subject's name, address, and/or telephone number45 Actual
legislative proposals have been introduced in a number of state legis-

43. See infra notes 157-59 (discussing tort); infra part IV.B (discussing Shibley v.
Time Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975), Dwyer v. American Express Co., 652
N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), and Avrahami v. U.S. News & World Rep., Inc., No.
96-203, (Cir. Ct. Arlington County June 13, 1996)).
At least one other commentator has argued that courts should remedy unauthorized sales of personal information, but through recognition of a new tort-based cause
of action. See Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial
Disseminationof PersonalInformation,65 Tex. L. Rev. 1395, 1434-38 (advocating creation of tort of commercial dissemination of personal information). Graham suggests
that the greatest impediment to legislative privacy protection is the legislature's lack
of a coherent understanding of privacy, although he also acknowledges that legislatures, "faced with the task of balancing the uncertain interests of business against the
undefined interests of individuals, might yield to business concerns and undervalue
personal privacy." Id. at 1424-25.
This Note argues that interest group pressure has, in fact, distorted legislative consideration of proposals to vest individuals with rights in personal information, and
further suggests that adequate protection can be achieved through extension of already-existing common law tort doctrine.
44. See e.g., Joshua D. Blackman, A Proposalfor Federal Legislation Protecting
Informational Privacy Across the Private Sector, 9 Santa Clara Computer & High
Tech. LU. 431, 468 (1993) (proposing federal statute tracking European Community
Draft Directive on Personal Data Management, Proposal for a Council Directive
Concerning the Protection of Individuals in Relation to the Processing of Personal
Data, art. 24.1, 1990 OJ. (C 277) 3, 10); Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of
Perpetual Sunlight Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 Berkeley
Tech. LJ. 1, 2 (1996) (proposing federal statute granting individuals property rights in
their electronic personas); Steven A. Bibas, Note, A ContractualApproach to Data
Privacy, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 591, 606-07 (1994) (proposing a statute mandating
that all consumer transactions include terms giving consumers an opportunity to
either opt-in or opt-out of secondary use of personal information, which would then
lead to a deregulated market-based system of personal information management);
Scott Shorr, Note, Personal Information Contracts: How to Protect Privacy Without
Vrolating the FirstAmendment, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1756, 1818 (1995) (proposing federal statute that would grant individuals property rights in their personal information
that would in turn serve as basis for "personal information contracts").
Bibas's Note eschews a broad regulatory scheme, and focuses primarily on the benefits of an unregulated market in personal information, the dynamics of which would
be influenced by society's shared privacy expectations. Bibas, supra, at 606-07.
45. See Blackman, supra note 44, at 468; Mell, supra note 44, at 76-81; Bibas, supra
note 44, at 606-07; Shorr, supra note 44, at 1818.
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latures over the past year.46 Again, not one, however, has been
successful.
This Note argues that despite the theoretical appeal of a legislative
solution to the issue of unauthorized dissemination of personal information, individuals should not wait for legislative action but rather
should continue to litigate the issue in state courts. Courts are well
suited to address the issue for two distinct but related reasons. First,
when appropriate, state courts can extend and modify the common
law to keep pace with technological and societal changes. Second, legislatures often are too beholden to special interests to thoughtfully
and rationally consider certain questions. Courts, which possess
greater independence than legislatures, must consider whether individuals should have legally enforceable rights in their names and personality profiles.
Part I examines the market for personal information, demonstrating
the ways in which personal information is gathered and sold. It cites
detailed survey data which suggests that many Americans feel they
have lost all control over personal information and wish to regain that
control.
Part II examines the current state of the law and the extent to which
current laws protect individuals' rights in information about themselves. It examines the scattered patchwork of federal and state statutes that provide some protection of personal information, and
concludes that this amalgam of reactive and industry-specific statutes
does not adequately address concerns raised by personal information
sales. Shifting to potential common law remedies against this practice,
part II then examines the development of the right to privacy, and the
potential utility of this strand of tort law.
Noting the deference to the legislature exercised by at least one
court that considered application of state tort law to personal information sales, part III examines the threshold question of institutional
competence, i.e., whether the court or the legislature is more competent to analyze potential legal responses to unauthorized dissemination of personal information. Part III focuses particularly on courts'
roles in light of the legislative process. It endorses a "Reform Model"
of judicial activity that urges courts to embrace their lawmaking function when interest group pressure distorts legislative processes. Part
III finally demonstrates that courts can and must consider the personal information issue on its merits, and thereby serve as catalysts for
legislative action to overcome interest groups' power to force on dispersed individuals the burden of inducing legislative action.
46. The state legislatures of California, New Jersey, and New York have entertained proposals that would restrict commercial dissemination of personal information. See infra notes 236-50 and accompanying text (discussing ill-fated proposals in
various state legislatures).
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Part IV examines the issue of individuals' rights in personal information in light of this view of the judicial role. It presents evidence

that interest group pressure has distorted legislative consideration of
proposals to vest individuals with such rights. Accordingly, part IV
argues, courts should adopt a Reform Model approach and expand
tort protection of individuals' rights in personal information. Finally,
part IV demonstrates that such an extension would not be unduly activist, but rather a natural step in the reasoned judicial development of
privacy tort doctrine.
I.

COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION

As described in the Introduction, businesses' ability to collect, process, store, and disseminate personal information is significant. This
part explains the nature of the personal information industry and reviews accumulating evidence that American consumers are becoming
increasingly concerned about their perceived loss of control over personal information.
Almost all day-to-day consumer and business transactions leave
some sort of an electronic record.47 Information about individuals is
collected by computers during transactions and subsequently stored in
computer databases.' Sources of information include: credit card

transactions, 49 mortgage records,5 0 magazine subscription information,5 ' birth records,52 warranty cards,53 point-of-purchase plans, s" and
driver registration records. Driver registration records historically

47. See James Greiff, Use of Credit Card Creates Mini-Profile of Consumer, Portland Oregonian, Sept. 13, 1993, at B10 (recounting activities that leave electronic
traces); supra note 1 (same).
48. Aryeh S. Friedman, Law and the Innovative Process: PreliminaryReflections,
1986 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 31 (noting ability of computers to process and crossreference information quickly, leading to "creat[ion of] personal profiles of individual
data subjects").
49. See Greiff, supra note 47, at B10; Miller, supra note 1, at A8.
50. See Miller, supra note 1, at Al.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Privacy Advocates Warn Against Warranty Cards, Wis. St. J., Dec. 27, 1995,
at 4D (noting that although many consumers believe that these cards are necessary to
activate warranty protection, filing the card is not necessary for protection in the
event that the product is defective).
54. Under "point-of-purchase" or "point-of-sales" plans, consumers receive a card
with a magnetic stripe; when they make a purchase, they are automatically given
credit for all store coupons then in effect and their purchase history is recorded by
household. Data Protection, Computers, and Changing Information Practices,Hearings on H.R. 685 Before the Subcommittee on Government Information, Justic and
Agriculture of the House Committee on Government Operations, 101st Cong., 2nd
Sess. 86 (1990) (statement of Jerry Saltzberger, Chief Executive Officer of Citicorp's
Point-of-Sale (POS) Information Services); see Blackman, supra note 44, at n.1.
These plans record tremendous amounts of detailed information, but are entered into
on a more consensual basis than the bulk of methods described above.
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have been a lucrative source of personal information.5 1 For example,
the state of Florida has quoted a price of $33 million for a one-time
sale of its motor vehicle records database.5 6 Because of recent cases
where such information was used to advance criminal behavior "
however, distribution of such records has become subject to
regulation.5
Direct marketers place these layers of information on top of one
another, and form a profile of the individual that represents some or
59 This practice results in the creation of an
all of the above factors.
"electronic persona,"6 and the resulting multi-faceted portrait is aptly
known as a "personality proffle."' 1 People inadvertently leave traces
that create this persona or profile simply by living their lives in an
them to leave electronic footprints alelectronic society that forces
62
most wherever they go.
55. Driver registration records have traditionally been available for public inspection, and many state Departments of Motor Vehicles have prepared lists and sold
them to interested direct marketers. DriversPrivacy Protection Act of 1993: Hearings
on H.R. 3365 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Mary J. Culnan,
associate professor, Georgetown University School of Business). Marketers use both
registration and drivers' license files to acquire a broad array of personal information.
Each type of record has names and addresses; in addition, however, registration files
have information on the types and years of cars that people own, and drivers' licenses
contain information about age, gender, weight, height, and need for corrective lenses.
These data are valuable to marketing profflers in a number of ways. For example, the
make and model of an individual's car may allow inferences about that individual's
income; the age of the car might signal the likelihood that the owner will soon
purchase a new car, and vital statistics, as reflected on a driver's license, might indicate the subject's likelihood of buying a particular good or service. Professor Culnan
cites the example of optometrists targeting senior citizens with bad eyesight who live
in a certain area. One marketing executive has stated that "nothing says more about
you than the car you drive." Id.; see also Jeffrey Rothfeder, Looking for a Job? You
May Be Out Before You Go In, Bus. Wk., Sept. 24, 1990, at 128 (noting the use of
motor-vehicle histories to investigate job applicants).
56. Larry Rohter, Florida Weighs Fees for Its Computer Data: Some See Profits,
Others Too High a Price, N.Y. Tunes, Mar. 31, 1994, at B9.
57. In 1989, actress Rebecca Schaeffer was murdered in the doorway of her California apartment. Her assailant was an obsessed fan who had stalked her for two
years; he finally obtained her home address when he hired a private investigator who
simply requested the address from the California Department of Motor Vehicles. Ellen Alderman & Caroline Kennedy, The Right to Privacy 325 (1995).
58. In response to a California stalking case in which the murderer found his victim through state motor vehicle records, see id,Senator Barbara Boxer proposed an
amendment to the crime bill that would give drivers the opportunity to opt-out of
disclosure of information such as height, weight, hair color, eye color, and corrected
vision. See Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994);
Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 1, at 518 n.105.
59. See Friedman, supra note 48, at 31; Reidenberg, Setting Standards,supra note
1, at 517.
60. Mell, supra note 44, at 3.
61. Id
62. Id ("We have not consciously created such images of our personae. They are
a function of the electronic trail of the information we leave in the wake of our use of
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While a record of any one factor standing alone has minimal value,
the compiled information which paints a comprehensive picture of the
individual, enables direct marketers to "target" their audience and in-

crease response rates on their promotions.' This "targeting" is extremely valuable to the marketers because it increases profits b
focusing mailings, decreasing mailing costs, and increasing returns.7
Consumers are becoming increasingly aware that businesses gather
and use personal information, and that there are occasionally dangerous consequences.65 Two recent surveys have attempted to gauge
Americans' concern over privacy issues. A 1994 Yankelovich Monitor
survey found that ninety percent of those polled favored leislation to
regulate business compilation of consumer information. Another
poll, part of an ongoing series commissioned by one of the "Big
Three" credit reporting bureaus,67 found that "[t]he vast majority of
Americans [eighty percent] agree that 'consumers have lost all control
any service that electronically records and/or stores information concerning our transactions."); Zain & Knoche, supra note 1, at 1A.
63. See Privacy Comm'n, supra note 40, at 126 ("The key fact to understand about
mailing lists ... is that they are almost never free-standing; they are names and addresses of individuals who have some type of association, usually an active one, with a
public or private organization.").
As Professor Reidenberg observed:
It is probably not commonly known that credit card companies develop lifestyle profiles of card holders, that telecommunications companies track users'
calling patterns, that product manufacturers track the habits of individual
customers, and that credit reporting agencies also assemble data on household composition (such as marital status of occupants) and on legal disputes
involving individuals.
Joel R.Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontierfor
IndividualRights?, 44 Fed. Comm. LJ.195, 205 (1992) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Fortress or Frontier] (citing David Churbuck, Smart Mail, Forbes, Jan. 22, 1990, at 107;
Jeffrey Rothfeder, Is Nothing Private?, Bus. Wk., Sept. 4, 1989 at 74, 74-82; Eben
Shapiro, MCI Discounts Expected on Numbers Called Often, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18,
1991, at D4).
The Standard Rate and Data Service mailing-list catalog is used widely in the direct
marketing industry, and "includes lists that reflect religion, sexual orientation, medical information, and political contributions." Judith Waldrop, The Business of Privacy,
American Demographics, Oct. 1994, at 46, 49.
64. Direct marketers testified at length to the 1977 Privacy Commission about the
economic necessity of mailing list profiling, stating: "[TJhe best direct-mail campaign
is the one that mails the least. This is a business necessity.... A piece of mail to an
individual who doesn't want to buy is wasted, and to direct mailers the elimination of
this kind of waste is absolutely essential." Privacy Comm'n, supra note 40, at 135
(quoting testimony of Association of American Publishers).
65. See Equifax Survey, supra note 26, at 5 (noting a significant increase in the
percentage of respondents believing that "technology has almost gotten out of control"); Yankelovich Survey, supra note 26, at 14.
66. See Yankelovich Survey, supra note 26, at 18; Montague, supra note 33, at 1.
67. The "Big Three" credit bureaus are Equifax, TRW, and Trans Union. In 1988
these three bureaus held a combined 410 million files on individuals. Jeffrey
Rothfeder, Is Nothing Private?, Bus. Wk., Sept. 4, 1989, at 74, 81; see What Price
Privacy, Consumer Rep., May 1, 1991, at 356 (estimating that the United States' credit
bureaus maintain files on almost 90% of all adult citizens). Annually since 1990,
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over how personal information about them is circulated and used by
companies."' 68 The 1995 numbers reflect a trend in which concern has
grown steadily since 1990.69
Additionally, a 1991 Time/CNN poll found that ninety-three percent of Americans believe that "companies that sell information to
others [should] be required by law to ask permission from individuals
before making the information available."70 Despite strong claims for
regulation in some surveys, the 1995 Equifax survey found that seventy-two percent of the respondents agree that "if companies and industry associations adopt good voluntary privacy policies, that would
be better than enacting government regulations."'" Respondents to
the second poll would back legislation, however, if these voluntary
mechanisms were not effective.7 Evidence suggests, however, that
this self-regulation has not been effective.
As mentioned above, the direct marketing industry is entirely free
from government regulation. 73 This fact is related to its successful
lobbying efforts in 1977 which led to Privacy Commission
recommen74
dations that the industry be allowed to police itself.
The Direct Marketing Association ("DMA") has established guidelines to self-monitor the industry. 7" The largest effort at self-regulation is the Mail Preference System ("MPS"). 76 This service allows
consumers to request that they no longer receive direct mail solicitation.7 7 Consumers write or call the centralized service, request that
mail or calls cease, and the service places their names on a "no soliciEquifax has commissioned privacy surveys conducted by Louis Harris and Associates.
Equifax Survey, supra note 26, at 1.
68. See Equifax Survey, supra note 26, at 23.
69. From 1990 through 1995, the percentage of people agreeing with the statement
that they had "lost all control over how personal information about them is circulated
and used by companies" grew steadily from 71% to 80%. Id. at 24.
70. Richard Lacayo, Nowhere to Hide, Time, Nov. 11, 1991, at 34, 36. The poll
also found that 88% believe that companies "[s]hould ... be required by law to make
the information [they collect about individuals] available to individuals so that possible inaccuracies may be corrected." In addition, 90% were found to believe that companies that collect and sell personal information should be prohibited by law from
selling information about household income, and 86% believed that companies
should be prohibited from selling information about bill-paying history. Finally, 68%
were found to believe that the law should prohibit companies from selling information about consumers' product purchases. Id.
71. Equifax Survey, supra note 26, at 10.
72. Id. at 13.
73. Reidenberg, Setting Standards,supra note 1, at 517 ("[N]o identifiable sectoral
law targets direct marketing.").
74. See Posch, supra note 34, at 3 (describing success of DMA lobbying efforts);
Privacy Comm'n, supra note 40, at 147.
75. Waldrop, supra note 63, at 48.
76. Anne Wells Branscomb, Who Owns Information? 15 (1994); Privacy Comm'n,
supra note 40, 144-46.
77. Branscomb, supra note 76, at 15.

1996]

PERSONAL INFORMATION

963

tation" list.7' Names are not removed from lists, however. Participating companies merely agree to cross-reference their marketing lists
with the "no solicitation" lists from MPS and refrain from contacting
those that have signed on to MPS. This means that name collection,
trading, and personality profiling continues unimpeded. 79 Also, the
request must be renewed after five years. The DMA requires that all
of its members participate in and comply with both MPS and the
analogous Telephone Preference Service ("TPS"), but this does not
provide comprehensive relief.
First, there is evidence that many Americans are unaware that these
services exist, and the participating companies do not make a particularly strong effort to publicize them.8 "[T]his ignorance reflects
either ineffectiveness or non-compliance even by those DMA members purporting to use the service."'" Additionally, a significant percentage of companies that deal in personal information are not
members of the DMA, and companies are not forced to join the DMA
and thus comply with its standards 2 Moreover, evidence suggests
that many of those who are members do not comply with DMA standards. s' In fact, it was estimated in 1994 that "fifty percent of catalogers don't give their customers a convenient way to remove their
names from the company's list." s And companies that are members
and do comply do not seem to exert influence on peer companies that
choose to ignore the guidelines.ns Finally, the guidelines provide
neither enforcement mechanisms nor remedies in the event of
breach. s6
In short, as recent testimony before Congress indicates, "[i]ndustry
self-regulation has not succeeded in establishing adequate privacy
safeguards." s These conclusions are not limited to "legal scholars,"
78. See Privacy Comm'n, supra note 40, at 141-42.
79. Children's Privacy Hearings, supra note 41 (testimony of Marc Rotenberg, Director of Electronic Privacy Information Center and faculty member of Georgetown
University Law Center) (noting that whatever the guidelines purport to do with regard to reducing the amount of junk-mail that participating individuals may receive,
they "[do] nothing to prevent the extensive profiling that companies pursue when
data is gathered").
80. Joel Reidenberg & Paul Schwartz, Data Privacy Law 333 (1996).
81. Id
82. Id.
83. A recent study of direct marketing practices found that only 53% of DMA
members are reported to the service to screen their mailings. Id. at 339. As privacyin-business expert Professor Mary Culnan states, "[Some c]ompanies sell their lists
and don't offer an opt-out box or tell people what they're doing with the information.
They think everybody else does business in that way." Waldrop, supra note 63, at 48.
84. Waldrop, supra note 63, at 48 (quoting Professor Mary Culnan and citing
figures provided at the DMA's spring 1994 meeting).
85. Id- at 49 (citing Professor Culnan's statement that "[c]ompanies need to call
other companies that violate industry guidelines. I don't think the DMA does this.").
86. Reidenberg & Schwartz, supra note 80, at 338.
87. Children's Privacy Hearings, supra note 41 (testimony of Marc Rotenberg).
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but also extend to public opinion pollss and editorials in major newspapers.8 9 This failure detracts from the industry's claim that self-regulation will always work because it is in the best interest of businesses
to narrow their mailing and respect consumers' opt-out choices."
Even industry insiders acknowledge that self-regulation is not the effective solution that it is often presented to be:
MPS and TPS alone will not do it for us.... They put the onus on
the consumer.., and participation is voluntary. And there are far
too many companies using databases and renting mailing lists who
are not members of DMA and wouldn't
know MPS from PMS....
91
"[B]ad guys don't self-regulate."
This widespread disregard for the industry's "self-policing" guidelines
"does not bode well for the industry's claims of effective selfregulation." 92
However one interprets this survey data and the evidence of the
industry's failed self-regulation, it is clear that Americans are concerned about control over personal information, so much so that some
legal protection of rights in that information seems appropriate. 93 As
part II demonstrates, however, the current level of legal protection is
inadequate.
II.

CuRRENT

LEGAL PROTECTION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION

The current legal framework does not adequately address the sale
of personal information. Specifically, privacy law has failed to keep
pace with advancing computer technology. 94 This part examines the
88. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text (detailing the results of public
opinion polls that indicate consumers' private sector privacy concerns).
89. A recent USA Today editorial remarked: "While voluntary compliance might
be preferable in an ideal world, it is not likely to work in the real world. The result is
that the absence of government prodding has resulted in too many companies doing
too little to protect consumers privacy rights." Editorial,USA Today, Oct. 25, 1995, at
A12.
Similar sentiments were echoed by The Economist, a conservative British magazine
that "virtually always defers to the private sector over government." Children's Privacy Hearings, supra note 41. "Enforcing the consent-rule will be difficult," remarked
the editors, "[b]ut it will be worth a try. It would give information-gatherers a push in
the right direction. Companies would collect and resell information more discriminately. And people who cherish digital privacy would have the means to protect itwhich is as it should be." Virtual Privacy, The Economist, Feb. 10, 1996, at 20.
90. Waldrop, supra note 63, at 50.
91. Karl Dentino, Taking Privacy into Our Own Hands; Direct Mail and
Telemarketing; Creative Strategies, Direct Marketing Mag., Sept. 1994, at 38.
92. Waldrop, supra note 63, at 48.
93. As one commentator who advocates a legislative solution to the problem has
stated, "these [privacy survey] statistics suggest that legislators, at least, would do well
to enact effective measures for securing [privacy rights in personal information].
Shorr, supra note 44, at 1764.
94. Mell, supra note 44, at 2-3. As Professor Mell notes:
Despite almost fifty years of experience with the information-management
ability of computers, society has not yet reformulated traditional notions of
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current legal protection against unauthorized dissemination of personal information, and concludes that neither federal nor state law
adequately protects individuals' privacy interests in information about
them.
A.

Legislative Enactments

Both federal95 and state96 statutory enactments that touch in some
way on personal information. Congress enacted the first federal legislation dealing directly with privacy in 1974.11 This statute, however,
deals exclusively with governmental threats to citizens' privacy, and
does not address privacy between citizens.98 Because the personal information sales at issue here involve private persons and organizations, the 1974 act is inapplicable. 99
In 1977, the United States Privacy Protection Study Commission
(the "Privacy Commission") released a report that addressed a
number of issues concerning privacy relations among private citizens. 10 The Privacy Commission made recommendations, but Congress has never acted on them. 10' In fact, Congress's activity with
regard to personal information protection has been largely reactive,
privacy, which restrict third-party access to personal information, to accommodate the tremendous storage capacity and instantaneous retrieval ability

afforded by computers. Concepts of privacy, property and the individual's

rights to both, take on a new dimension when the use of computer-stored
information allows images of the individual-the "electronic persona"-to
be created and used by a variety of third parties without the individual's
knowledge.
Id. at 3.
95. For a detailed description of federal statutes which in some way relate to personal information, see id. at 82-85. These statutes do not effectively protect individuals' rights in personal information. See Reidenberg, Fortressor Frontier,supra note 63,
at 199. As Professor Reidenberg notes, "[T]he American legal system responds incoherently and incompletely to the privacy issues raised by existing information processing activities in the business community." Id.
96. See infra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
97. Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994).
98. NTIA Inquiry, supra note 15, at 6847 (noting that the Privacy Act of 1974
"provide[s] federal guidelines governing the compilation, use, and dissemination of
personal information gathered by government agencies"); Waldrop, supra note 63, at
49 (recounting statement of Rob Veeder, privacy advocate for the Internal Revenue
Service, that "[tihe Federal Privacy Act ...governs how federal agencies use data
about U.S. Citizens. It doesn't cover the rest of the world.").
99. Id.
100. See Privacy Comm'n, supra note 40. The commission addressed: (1) the consumer-credit relationship, (2) the depository relationship, (3) mailing lists, (4) the insurance relationship, (5) the employment relationship, (6) record keeping in the
medical care relationship, (7) investigative reporting agencies, and (8) record keeping
in the education relationship. Id. at xiii.
101. Reidenberg, Fortressor Frontier,supra note 63, at 197,208. Significant recommendations advocated self-regulation and recommended that companies not be required to remove consumers names from lists. See Privacy Comm'n, supra note 40, at
147, 151.
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targeting industries on a case by case basis, °2 and often responding
only after extreme instances of privacy infringement. 3
Relatively strict, but objectively tame, regulation exists in the home
entertainment industry.' °4 In 1988 Congress enacted a law to regulate
the videocassette rental industry. 0 5 The law is a prime example of
reactive lawmaking, developed in response to the controversial
Supreme Court nomination proceedings of Robert Bork."°6 During
Bork's nomination hearings, a Washington newspaper reporter acquired a list of Bork's videocassette rentals.107 This action highlighted
individuals' vulnerability to privacy violations by outsiders with access
to consumer records, and spurred a quick legislative reaction.10 8 The
resulting law affords some protection of consumer information related
to videocassette rental, but successful lobbying efforts by the Direct
Marketing Association limited its effectiveness.' 0 9 As originally
drafted, the bill would have banned disclosure of any video lists that in
any way indicated the content and type of the customer's rentals. 1 0
For instance, stores would have been prohibited, even, from distributing lists organized by themes, such as "action/adventure," "romantic
comedy," or "adult," because such categories would by themselves indicate the customers' rental preferences."' The DMA successfully
lobbied, however, and the bill was amended." 2 It now allows stores
to distribute customer names and addresses categorized by subject
matter for direct marketing purposes, provided that the customer
has
3
been given the opportunity to opt out of such a program."
Similarly, the cable television industry is subject to restrictions on
uses of its customers' personal information." 4 Cable systems may not
be used to gather personal information without prior consent from the
subscriber. 1 5 Subscriber information may be disclosed to third par102. Reidenberg, Fortress or Frontier,supra note 63, at 209 (describing "mosaic"
approach to privacy that responds to specific defined problems).
103. See Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 1, at 505-06 ("Following the
principle of free flow of information, legislatures respond only to specific issues; legal
rules, if any, are justified only when they narrowly target particular problems. These
legal rules tend to develop as an ad hoc response to public scandal.")
104. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-11 (1994).
105. Id
106. See Stephen Advokat, Publication of Bork's Video Rentals Raises Privacy Issue, Chi. Trib., Nov. 20, 1987, at 106.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Posch, supra note 34, at 3.
110. Id
111. Id
112. Id
113. Disclosure of any other "personally identifiable information... [requires] informed, written consent of the consumer given at the time the disclosure is sought."
18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B) (1994).
114. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1994) (as amended by Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385 § 20, 106 Stat. 1460, 1497 (1992)).
115. Id § 551 (b)(1) (1994).
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ties only: 1) for a legitimate business activity related to the provision
17
of the service;" 6 or 2) when the subscriber consents in advance.'
Again, however, direct-marketing use survives the statute, as mailing
lists of subscribers may
be disseminated if each subscriber has an op1 18
out.
opt
to
portunity
Congress has targeted other industries with respect to personal information dissemination, although with considerably less force. The
Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 119 which targets the financial
services industry, is widely acknowledged as inadequate. 20 In fact,
FRCA's weakness is widely acknowledged to be a result of extreme
lobbying pressure.'21 Other limited statutes regulate other aspects of

116. kd- § 551 (c)(2)(A).
117. Id. § 551 (c)(2)(C).
118. Id

119. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 (1994). The Act is limited to Credit Reporting agencies
only, i.e., organizations that prepare and disseminate personal information in a con-

sumer report bearing on the individual's: credit worthiness, credit standing, credit
capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living.
Id.
120. See Reidenberg, Fortressor Frontier,supra note 63 at 210-14 (analyzing Act in
context of informational privacy concerns and revealing its shortcomings); Shorr,
supra note 44, at 1784 ("In practice... the FCRA permits credit bureaus and their
customers to exchange large quantities of detailed consumer information with
impunity.").
121. See Jeffrey Rothfeder, Privacy for Sale 17 (1992) (noting that the bill was
"butchered; it was drawn and quartered and its vitals were left on the committee's
chopping block" by the insertion of a "remarkably broad exception" as a result of
industry lobbying pressure (quoting Harvard Law School Professor Arthur Miller));
Bibas, supra note 44, at 596 & n.39.
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finance, 12 as well as telecommunications, 2 3 education, 2 4 and the
postal service.'2
With regard to the sale of personal information in the mailing list
context, the 1977 Privacy Commission recommended that.businesses
126
not be required to remove consumers' names from mailing lists.
Rather, the Privacy Commission merely recommended that organizations provide consumers with notice as to possible secondary use of
gathered information
and allow consumers the opportunity to opt-out
27
of such uses'
122. See Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1994) (requiring
prior notification and other procedures for the disclosure of financial information by a
depositary institution); Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693 (1994) (requiring that electronic fund transfer service contracts with consumers establishing
fund services include the circumstances under which the financial institution will disclose information about the consumer).
123. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711 (1994); Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. § 227; Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994)
(prohibiting persons operating an electronic communication service or providing remote computing services from knowingly divulging the contents of a communication
if not authorized by agreement to access the contents).
One particularly unsettling potential abuse of telecommunications technology concerns private parties' use of PEN registers. A PEN register is a device attached to a
telephone line that records only the numbers dialed from a given phone; it neither
records nor monitors any conversation that may occur, because it disconnects immediately after the call is dialed and before the dialed party answers the call. Susan
Friewald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After the Digital Telephony
Act, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 949, 982-83 (1996).
Using the PEN register, marketers record consumers outgoing calls to track calling
patterns and use this information to enhance profiles. See Reidenberg, Fortress or
Frontier,supra note 63, at 215-16 ("The use by private parties of PEN registers to
record outgoing call information and trap and trace devices to record incoming call
data is even permitted. Companies are increasingly using such technology to collect
information on consumers without their knowledge." (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(h);
United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 166 (1977))).
124. See Family Educational Rights Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1994) (restricting disclosure of education files).
125. See 39 U.S.C. §§ 3008, 3011 (1994). These postal anti-pandering laws permit
consumers to block mail which they find to be sexually provocative.
126. The Commission believed that businesses would voluntarily adopt privacy
safeguards. Privacy Comm'n, supra note 40, at 150-51. Seeking a balance "between
the interests of individuals and the interests of mailers," the Commission recommended "[tlhat a person engaged in interstate commerce who maintains a mailing list
should not be required by law to remove an individual's name and address from such
a list upon request of that individual, except as already provided by law." Id. at 147.
The Commission was swayed by the economic importance of direct-mail, the reliance
of non-profits and political candidates on direct mail, and the technological impracticability of mandating a system of name removal. Id. at 147-48.
127. The recommendation reads:
That a private-sector organization which rents, sells, exchanges, or otherwise
makes the addresses, or names and addresses, of its customers, members, or
donors available to any other person for use in direct-mail marketing or solicitation, should adopt a procedure whereby each customer, member, or donor is informed of the organization's practice in that respect, including a
description of the selection criteria that might be used in selling, renting or
exchanging lists, such as ZIP codes, interest, buying patterns, and level of
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The Privacy Commission refused to recommend that information
collectors be obligated to notify individuals of information practices or
honor their objections to dissemination. The Privacy Commission
found such an obligation unnecessary because of a perceived willingness by information collection organizations to undertake this responsibility voluntarily.1 "a As Professor Reidenberg has noted, however[fln the last few years, both the development of industry norms and
the implementation of appropriate business practices for self-regulation, as well as the consensus on a self-regulatory model, have broken down. Public opinion no longer views industry treatment of
personal information as benign, and Congress is waking up from
years of dormancy. 129
The Privacy Commission report is outdated, and its findings have been
overcome by technology. Indeed, enhanced computer technology has
left private citizens defenseless against businesses' gathering, processing, and disseminating personal information. 13° This has led at least
one commentator to reflect that "[t]his subject is not going to go away.
As technology develops and people get more and more of an ability to
sort and slice and dice information, we're going to have to talk about
this and 13
stay
on top of it. Otherwise, it will get completely out of
1
control."'
In this regard, three United States Senators recently sent a letter to
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") requesting that it "conduct a
activity, and, in addition, is given an opportunity to indicate to the organiza-

tion that he does not wish to have his address, or name and address, made

available for such purposes. Further, when a private-sector organization is
informed by one of its customers, members, or donors that he does not want
his address, or name and address, made available to another person for use
in direct-mail marketing or solicitation, the organization should promptly
take whatever steps are necessary to assure that the name and address is not
so used, including notifying a multiple-response compiler or a credit-bureau
to whom the name and address has been disclosed with the prospect that it
may be used to screen or otherwise prepare lists of names and addresses for
use in direct-mail marketing or solicitation.
Privacy Comm'n, supra note 40, at 151.
128. Id at 152-53.
129. Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 1, at 498.
130. See Reidenberg, Fortress or Frontier, supra note 63, at 197-98. Professor
Reidenberg notes:
During the 1980s, the dramatic advances in telecommunications and information technology changed the relationship between individuals and cororations with respect to the circulation of personal information. Information
technology and networking significantly enhanced the extent of available
personal information and eliminated inefficient record-keeping practices
that once kept personal information from public scrutiny.... Vast quantities
of personal information containing greater detail than ever before about an
individual's financial status, health status, activities and personal associations
are now readily available through commercial information services and list
brokers.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
131. Waldrop, supra note 63, at 54.

970

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

study of possible violations of consumer privacy rights by companies
that operate computer data bases."' 32 The letter reflects the growing
public concern over compilation and unauthorized dissemination of
personal information:
We have received calls and letters from constituents who are greatly
disturbed about the compilation, sale, and usage of these data-bases. They, as well as consumers in general, are concerned about the
potential intrusion upon, and violation of, individual privacy rights.
There also is concern
about the potential abusive and unlawful us133
age of the data.
It is too early to tell whether the Commission will accept this invitation, and what the study will yield. As discussed below, however, interest groups will likely have a significant effect on the FTC response
to the report, as well as on the fate of any legislative proposals that
may grow from it. 34
Like their federal counterparts, state enactments often target specific areas and fail to provide comprehensive privacy protection. The
level of protection varies from state to state, but generally protection
exists in industry-specific settings. 35 Virtually all states recognize the
132. Letter from Senators Richard Bryan, Larry Pressler, and Ernest Hollings to
The Honorable Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (Oct. 8,
1996). The letter requests that the study address four specific questions:
(1) Is the non-consensual compilation, sale, and usage of data-base a violation of private citizens' civil rights?
(2) Are the data-bases subject to unlawful usage? Do they create an undue
potential for fraud on consumers?
(3) Are the compilation, sale and usage of consumers' personal data consistent with the Fair Credit Reporting Act and federal telemarketing
regulations?
(4) Are there ways consumers can prevent data-based service companies
from including their personal background information in commercial data
bases absent their consent?
Id The letter, which requests that the investigation begin immediately, asks that a
report be submitted six months after the Commission gathers its findings and formulates conclusions for legislative action. Id.
133. Id
134. See infra part IV.A (discussing the influence that powerful and organized interest groups such as the DMA can exert on legislative consideration of issues that
would extend rights to individuals who do not possess such organized strength); see
also Posch, supra note 34, at 3 (noting successes of direct marketing lobby at the
Federal level and observing that the DMA is "a lobby group always in place with a
track record better than the NRA, AARP or any other big name lobby group"). As
stated by an aide to former Senator William Proxmire in reference to credit bureau
attempts to quell privacy legislation, "[tjhe credit bureaus tend to know their local
congressmen very well." Rothfeder, supra note 67, at 81-82 (quoting former Senate
aide Kenneth McLean).
135. See generally Reidenberg, Fortressor Frontier,supra note 63, at 227-36 (detailing state statutes addressing the financial services, telecommunications, home entertainment, information services, and insurance industries).v For a general overview
of state privacy statutes, see Robert E. Smith, Compilation of State and Federal Privacy Laws (1992).
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right of privacy in some form, either at common law or by statute. 36
California increased its protection in 1993 when it passed a bill requiring credit card issuers to notify their customers that their names and
addresses may be sold to direct marketers; 37 the law also mandates
that these companies give customers a way to opt-out of having their
names sold or rented. 138 Although this statute is a positive legislative
step, there is evidence that it is misdirected because credit card companies are not very active in the reselling of customer data. 39 It is
also questionable whether such protection would be successful on a
broader scale, given the ill-fated introduction in 1996 of legislation
that would vest individuals with rights in personal information. 40
B.

The Right to Privacy

Questions about control over personal information traditionally
have been conceived under the privacy rubric.' 4 ' It is therefore useful
to look to that right as a potential source of protection against the
unauthorized dissemination of personal information. Currently, this
area of law does not vest individuals with a right to prevent unauthorized dissemination of personal information. This section discusses the
current state of the right to privacy and examines how this doctrine
might apply to unauthorized sales of personal information. It concludes by noting one court's observation that legislatures, rather than
courts, should address the issue of individuals' rights in personal
information.
As an initial matter, it is important to distinguish among the distinct
kinds of privacy in American law. 42 Unlike constitutional notions of
privacy, which focus on the rightholder's conduct and "immunize"
136. For a comprehensive overview of state privacy law, see McCarthy, supra note
155, §§ 6.1-.15.
137. Cal. Civ. Code. § 1748.12 (West 1996).
138. Id
139. Greiff, supra note 47, at B10 ("The California bill 'singles out credit card issu-

ers for invasion of privacy attention, when credit card issuers aren't really much of a
culprit in this thing' .... Catalog companies and magazines violate consumer privacy
much more often." (quoting Nationsbank spokesman)).
140. See infra notes 236-50 and accompanying text (detailing interest group pressure leading to failure of proposal that would have granted individuals' rights in per-

sonal information).
141. See Reidenberg, Setting Standards,supra note 1, at 498 (noting how "[p]rivacy
serves as a catch-all term").
142. See J.D. Lee & Barry Lindahl, Modem Tort Law- Liability & Litigation
§ 48.01 (1996) (distinguishing constitutional privacy from common law and statutory
privacy); Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 1, at 501-04 (contrasting constitutional restraints on government, which emphasize "protection[ ] of the citizen against
the government," with the right to privacy as between private citizens); Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv. L Rev. 737, 740 (1989) (distinguishing
among privacy expectations secured by the Constitution, the Fourth Amendment, and
state tort law).
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some of that conduct from state action,' 43 the privacy rights at issue
here are concerned primarily with individuals' power to "limit[ ] the
ability of others to gain, disseminate, or use information about oneself."'"

Protection against governmental intrusion of this kind comes

from the Fourth Amendment'
46

45 and

similar provisions of state consti-

tutions.
Protection against intrusion made by private
persons, how47
ever, comes almost exclusively from state tort law.'

American courts addressing privacy between private persons have
been influenced largely by the work of Professor Prosser. In his 1960
law review article, Privacy," Professor Prosser surveyed cases decided under the privacy rubric, and argued that the right to privacy
was in fact four separate torts: 149 intrusion upon seclusion;1 50 public

143. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 n.25 (1977). As noted in Whalen,
privacy in this Constitutional context, in contrast to the Fourth Amendment and tort
contexts, concerns the individual's "interest in independence in making certain kinds
of important decisions." Id. at 599-600. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), the
court stated that in areas such as "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing ...there are limitations on the States' power to substantively regulate conduct." I& at 713.
144. Rubenfeld, supra note 142, at 740; Westin, supra note 30, at 7 (defining privacy
as "the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others").
145. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
146. See, e.g., N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 12 (protecting against unlawful searches and
seizures); People v. Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575, 577 (N.Y. 1976) (applying art. 1, § 12
of the New York Constitution to invalidate illegally executed search of individual's
residence).
147. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 117, at 84969 (5th ed. 1984) (detailing state law development of privacy doctrine).
148. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960).
149. Id.at 389. The tort previously had been undifferentiated. The First Restatement addressed privacy by stating merely that "[a] person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to others or his
likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other." Restatement of Torts § 867
(1939).

150. Prosser, supra note 148, at 389. The intrusion tort has been characterized as
intentional intrusion "upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(B) (1977); see, e.g., Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d
701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969) (extending "tort of invasion of privacy to instances of intrusion, whether by physical trespass or not, into spheres from
which an ordinary man in a plaintiffs position could reasonably expect that the particular defendant should be excluded").
Because it is concerned with plaintiff's activity in obtaining information, this tort's
utility in the personal information context is limited to data collection, rather than
dissemination. See Reidenberg, Fortressor Frontier,supra note 63, at 222-23 (noting
that the intrusion tort "does not address other data protection practices such as the
storage, use and disclosure of personal information").
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disclosure of private facts;'5 1 false light;' 52 and appropriation of one's
name or likeness for commercial gain.'5 3 The Restatement (Second) of
and most states enforce
Torts has acknowledged these distinctions,'55

some or all of the causes of action.'

Of these four torts, it appears that the appropriation tort'5 is the
most likely to provide protection against unauthorized dissemination

of personal information. 157 This tort enjoys recognition in virtually
every state through statute or case law.15 8 Plaintiffs in three separate
cases have attempted to use the appropriation tort to enjoin direct151. Prosser, supra note 148, at 392. According to the Restatement (Second), this
tort applies to the giving of "publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another," where such information is not of legitimate concern to the public, and the
nature of the disclosure is "highly offensive" to a reasonable person. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 652(D) (1977); Reidenberg, Fortressor Frontier,supra note 63, at
223-24; Shorr, supra note 44, at 1779-80. This tort is not likely to apply to unauthorized dissemination of personal information, because any information voluntarily disclosed in the first instance would be removed from its coverage, and the publication
requirement is of a magnitude not reached in the course of intercompany personal
profile sales. Reidenberg, Fortress or Frontier,supra note 63, at 223-24.
152. Prosser, supra note 148, at 398. The false light tort guarantees one's right to be
"secure from publicity that places [a) person in a false light before the public." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(E) (1977). This tort would not apply to unauthorized dissemination of personal information because the information here is in most
cases true, and the tort requires that the information in question be false or erroneous. Further, the tort requires public dissemination, and the intercompany exchange
that would most often occur in the context of personal information exchanges would
not reach the necessary threshold of publication. See Reidenberg, Fortressor Frontier,
supra note 63, at 224-25.
153. Prosser, supra note 148, at 401.
154. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(A) (1977).
155. See generally J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy §§ 6.1.3 (1996) (discussing generally the states' adoption of some or all of Prosser's privacy
causes of action).
156. The appropriation tort is defined in the Restatement as follows:
Appropriation of Name or Likeness: One who appropriates to his own use
or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(C) (1977); see also Keeton et al., supra note 147,
§ 117, at 851-54; Prosser, supra note 148, at 389.
157. See Mell, supra note 44, at 25 ("The appropriation tort, being a mix of property and privacy concepts, would be the most likely tort to protect the individual's
interest in his persona."); Reidenberg, Fortress or Frontier, supra note 63, at 225
("[The tort-based] protection against the misappropriation of one's name may offer
coverage... to ban.. . dissemination of personal information for commercial purposes without consent."); Graham, supra note 43, at 1414 ("[T]he appropriation tort
could be stretched to cover the situation in which an individual profile, instead of a
name or likeness, is used by another."); Shorr, supra note 44, at 1818 ("[T]he theory
of property underlying the misappropriation tort and the right to publicity provides
the strongest legal foundation for the recognition of property rights in personal
information.").
158. Keeton et al., supra note 147, § 117 at 851-54 (discussing acceptance of privacy
appropriation tort); McCarthy, supra note 155 § 6.1 (same).
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marketing related sales of their names and addresses, 5 9 but none of
these attempts has been successful. The first case, Shibley v. Time,
Inc.,16° which was decided on questionable grounds,' 6 ' is particularly
notable for the manner in which the court suggested that the legislature, rather than the court, is competent to consider the issue in the
first place. After stating that Time Magazine was not liable under a
privacy theory for selling subscriber lists without first obtaining the
consent of the subscribers, the court stated that it was not competent
62
"to create a specific right which is not recognized at common law."'
It continued to note that:
The founders of our nation constitutionally set up a government
composed of three branches-the legislative, executive and judicial.
It is improper for one to invade the province of the other. This is a
case peculiarly within the province of the legislative branch and it
would be improper for the judicial branch to usurp the legislative
function. The judicial branch may interpret the laws enacted by the
legislative branch but it may not legislate, and that is what would be
required if the plaintiff is to succeed here.' 63
In this regard, the Shibley court raised an important issue: what institution-a court or a legislature-is competent to decide whether individuals should be vested with legal rights in personal information?
Part III addresses this threshold question of institutional competence.
III. A THRESHOLD QUESTION OF INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE
When a court is asked to change the law, as in a case seeking to
establish individuals' rights in personal information, the threshold
question is one of institutional competence: what institution-the
court or the legislature-is best suited to make the proposed
change?'" As stated by Justice Stevens in a case that involved federal
common lawmaking,
159. See infra part IV.B (discussing Shibley v. Tme, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1975), Dwyer v. American Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (I1. App. Ct. 1995),
and Avrahami v. U.S. News & World Rep., Inc., No. 96-203, (Cir. Ct. Arlington
County June 13, 1996)).
160. 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
161. See infra part IV.B.1.
162. 341 N.E.2d at 340.
163. Id.(quoting Shibley v. Tme, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 791, 795 (Ct. C.P. Ohio (1974)).
164. See, e.g., Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 480 So. 2d 1366, 1372
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (Barfield, J., concurring). In Shands, a Florida appeals
court refused to overrule state Supreme Court precedent and accordingly deferred to
the legislature on whether the common law "necessaries" doctrine should be extended to hold a female spouse liable for debts incurred by her husband, absent a
contractual obligation to that effect. Id. at 1366.
In concurrence, Judge Barfield took the opportunity to expound at length on the
threshold institutional competence issue, arguing strongly against what he saw as "the
expanding judicial activism seen in this country over the last several decades." Id. at
1373. He noted that the institutional competence question could be reduced to "by
whom and to what extent the [law] should be changed," noting further that the ques-
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When judges are asked to embark on a lawmaking venture ...they
should carefully consider whether they, or a legislative body, are
better equipped to perform the task at hand ..... []hen we are
asked to create an entirely new doctrine-to answer "questions of
policy on which Congress has not spoken,"-we have a special duty
to identify the proper
decisionmaker before trying to make the
65
proper decision.

Institutional competence questions of this kind were explored extensively when twentieth-century American jurisprudence moved away
from formalist notions of law' 66 and toward realist conceptions of judicial decision-making that acknowledged judges do, in fact, make
law. 67 Recognition of courts' lawmaking abilities naturally entailed
questions concerning when and under what circumstances courts
should be authorized to create, or be prevented from creating,
changes to the law.'" The questions were first explored at length by
scholars who spawned what has come to be known as the "Legal Process School."' 169 This conception of the judicial role acknowledges the

lawmaking function of judges but simultaneously imposes restraints
on their ability to craft new legal rules. The restraint of this "Legal

tion "is one which requires an examination of the requirements of effective change
and the relative abilities of courts and legislatures to satisfy those requirements." Id.
at 1372. "In brief," he continued, "those arguments center on considerations of the
relative competence of judges and legislators to formulate and enforce social policy."
dE at 1372-73.
165. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 531 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
166. Formalism can be characterized by the belief, on one level, that "there exist[s]
a handful of permanent, unchanging, indispensable principles of law imperfectly embodied in the many thousands of published judicial opinions, and that the goal of legal
reasoning was to penetrate the opinions to the principles." Richard Posner, The
Problems of Jurisprudence 15 (1990). At another level, formalism views law as an
inductive science. Id.At either level, formalism views justice as independent from the
world of facts. Id.at 16.
167. See Edmund Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 Geo. Wash. L Rev.
229, 236 (1981); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 Mich. L Rev. 875, 87677 (1991) (revealing that "since the time of the legal realists, the policymaking role of
the courts has become undeniable, and that policymaking has taken an increasingly
conscious ex ante perspective") (citing M. Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common
Law 1-3, 26-37 (1988)).
168. Ursin, supra note 167, at 236 ("Once recognized, however, judicial creativity
also must be restricted, both because of democratic theory and because of the potential misuse of unbridled judicial power.").
169. The pioneers of Legal Process thinking were Henry Hart and Albert Sacks.
See id.at 230 (noting that Hart and Sacks "exemplify and have shaped" the Legal
Process Model). Their work, for many years only in a tentative edition, see Henry A.
Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process (1958), has recently been published.
See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law xi (Villiam N. Eskridge & Phillip P. Frickey eds.,
1994).
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Process Model"'170 grows out of respect for "the tenet of democratic
theory that lawmakers should be accountable to the electorate."''
The mid-to-late twentieth century saw the development of a more
activist view of the judicial role, in what has been termed a "Reform
Model."' Rather than restrict courts for fear that they will usurp
democratic lawmaking functions, the Reform Model confronts the
"practical necessity of judicial innovation to meet constantly changing
73
conditions and values.'1
The two models differ most significantly in the faith they place in
legislative processes. This part continues by examining each model
and comparing their faith in the legislative process.
A.

The Legal Process Model

Under the Legal Process formulation, courts should consider various factors to determine their competence to make changes in the law.
Broadly, courts should examine, among other factors, "the magnitude
of a proposed change, the controversiality of the change, and ...
whether the change would be characterized as 'political."" 174 Courts
must evaluate whether the reforms at issue "affect or become involved
in current political controversy," and should "abstain from initiating
170. The "Legal Process Model" and "Reform Model" terminology was used by
Professor Ursin in his 1981 article, the thesis of which is borrowed from heavily here.
See Ursin, supra note 167, at 230-31.
171. Id at 230.
172. Id at 231.
173. Id at 231.
174. Id at 239 (citing Robert E. Keeton, Venturing To Do Justice 43 (1969)). One
recent commentator, influenced by the Legal Process Model, proposed an analytical
construct that courts could use to evaluate their competence to create new legal rules.
Comment, Reforming the Common Law: A FactorAnalysis for Alabama Courts, 34
Ala. L. Rev. 631, 632 (1983). The relevant factors include, among others: the ability
of the court, as opposed to the legislature, to gather data concerning society's "needs
and attitudes" with regard to the proposed change; the likelihood that the legislature
will evaluate fairly the data that it gathers "without ignoring the social needs of less
organized segments of society;" whether the change in the law can be achieved
through a "clear and simple rule" that the court can enunciate in the case before it;
"the comprehensiveness of the change," with regard to the degree that the new rule
will change, create, or destroy a large set of social relations; the reliance interest of
certain segments of the population in the current status of the law, and whether imposition of a new rule would harm them; the court's ability to employ remedies to implement the rule; and the effect that judicial action would have on future legislative
action or inaction. Id at 632-33. Additionally, courts are often criticized because they
are seen as less able to weigh the "empirical data" that should be factored into decisions on legal rules and policies. Bernard S. Meyer, Justice, Bureaucracy, Structure,
and Simplification, 42 Md. L. Rev. 659, 679 (1983).
Of particular relevance in the personal information context are those factors implicating the legislature's willingness to act and ability, when it does take action, to do so
fairly. This Note suggests that courts should be more willing to make law in those
instances where interest group pressure adversely affects legislative determination of
whether and how to address proposals.
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reforms that, in the context, would be generally regarded as essentially political in nature."'175
Legal Process adherents maintain that in order to avoid such political and social controversy, courts should only decide those issues
which they can neutrally adjudicate. 76 Neutrality in this context
means that "a court should not use a policy if it imposes disproportionate burdens on a particular group (as contrasted with the population generally), unless there are special reasons that can be adduced
for imposing those burdens."' 177 In short, the Legal Process Model
advocates judicial restraint to ensure neutral decision-making by a judiciary that is not accountable to the electoral process. 7
Many courts have adopted a Legal Process approach to judicial lawmaking and have deferred to their respective legislatures, on issues
including: comparative/contributory negligence standards; 1 79 apportionment of damages among joint tortfeasors in wrongful death
cases; 80 creation of a duty upon insurance companies to investigate
potential existence of heirs in wrongful death claims;' 8 ' recognition of

175. Keeton, supra note 174, at 92.
176. See Ursin, supra note 167, at 240; Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules
and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 Yale L.J. 221,
236 (1973).
177. Wellington, supra note 176, at 236.
178. Ursin, supra note 167, at 240. As Professor Wellington states, because "many
policies which might serve as justification for rules fail of neutrality, in that they are
too partisan, common law courts, if they are to exercise power legitimately, are drastically limited in their capacity to implement policies." Wellington, supra note 176, at
241.
179. See Fuller v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672, 674 (Iowa 1980). In this negligence
action, the court acknowledged that comparative negligence doctrine is superior to
contributory negligence doctrine, but nonetheless deferred to the legislature. Id. The
dissent, after noting that the majority declined to adopt the doctrine despite conclusive evidence of its superiority to contributory negligence, observed that:
If the legislature wishes to disapprove our common-law decisions and rule
changes, it has the right to do so, but the mere existence of that right should
not chill the court's initiative in making the changes. We ought to put our
own house in order. It is neither necessary nor appropriate to defer to the
legislature in the first instance.
Id. at 678 (McCormick, J., dissenting).
180. See Black Belt Wood Co. v. Sessions, 514 So. 2d 1249, 1263 (Ala. 1986) ("After
full consideration we think, however, that such a far-reaching change, if desirable,
should be made by the legislature rather than by the court. The [legislature] is the
department of government to which the constitution has entrusted the power of
changing the laws." (quoting Golden v. McCurry, 392 So. 2d 815, 817 (Ala. 1981)
(quoting Maki v. Frelk, 239 N.E.2d 445, 447 (IMI1968))).
181. See Spearman v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 230 Cal. Rptr. 264, 268 (Ct.
App. 1986) ("We defer the imposition of such a duty to the State Legislature if it
deems it advisable in the public interest.").
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1' and extension of necessaries
claims for loss of parental consortium;
83
doctrine to female spouses.'
In these cases and others, courts acting under the Legal Process
Model are driven by a concern that laws in political or social areas be
made only by a body that is "subject to the check of the ballot box."'"
Accordingly, the brunt of lawmaking responsibility rests with legislatures. In light of this conclusion, Legal Process adherents concede imperfections in legislative processes, specifically that legislative action is
not equally available to all, but rather favors those groups with the
interest and energy to plead their case.' 85 Unfortunately, however,
the Legal Process Model does not embrace the consequence that this
reality has on its theory of legislative supremacy.' 8 6 Their observation
fails to acknowledge that those groups with interest and energy may
nonetheless lack the money necessary to induce legislative consideration of the issue at hand. 87 If, in fact, legislative action is not equally
available to all, one must question whether the legislative branch truly
protects and furthers the democratic ethos in the manner that the
Legal Process Model suggests.

B.

The Reform Model

In contrast to the Legal Process Model, the Reform Model 88 is not
concerned with an overreaching judiciary but rather fears that the
common law will not be responsive enough to social change.' 89 Imperfections in legislative processes lead to the belief that "[t]he judiciary's responsibility when exercising its lawmaking function may be
greater than that of the other branches because of its greater accessibility and its responsiveness."19g Accordingly, the Reform Model
182. See Morgel v. Winger, 290 N.W.2d 266, 267 (N.D. 1980); Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 652 P.2d 318, 324 (Or. 1982).
183. See Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 480 So. 2d 1366, 1366 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
184. See Ursin, supra note 167, at 248.
185. Wellington, supra note 176, at 240-41.
186. Ursin, supra note 167, at 248.
187. See id.; see also Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an
American City 109-14 (1961); Harry Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics 34 (1960); Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How 24-25 (1936); Geraint Parry,
Political Elites 109-14 (1969); Posner, supra note 166, at 354 (noting that "legislators
are rational maximizers of their satisfactions just like everyone else.... [T]hey want
to be elected and reelected, and they need money to wage an effective campaign.
This money is more likely to be forthcoming from well-organized groups than from
unorganized individuals.").
188. The "Reform Model" terminology was employed by Professor Ursin, and the
model itself is said to have been exemplified and influenced by the work of the California Supreme Court in the 1960s and 1970s, especially in the opinions of Justice
Roger Traynor. See Ursin, supra note 167, at 229, 231.
189. Id.
190. Meyer, supra note 174, at 662.
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views courts as completely competent to make law, and demands that
courts embrace this role.
A vast body of public-choice literature191 informs the Reform
Model analysis of institutional competence. These writings support
the Reform Model's criticism that legislatures are not truly independent lawmaking bodies because of interest groups' pervasive effect on
legislative processes." 9 A useful description of an "interest group"
theory of legislation is the economic model described by Professor
Landes and Judge Posner:
In the economists' version of the interest-group theory of government, legislation is supplied to groups or coalitions that outbid rival
seekers of favorable legislation. The price that the winning group
bids is determined both by the value of legislative protection to the
group's members and the group's ability to overcome the free-rider
problems that plague coalitions. Payment takes the form of campaign contributions, votes, implicit promises of future favors, and
sometimes outright bribes. In short, legislation is 'sold' by 193
the legislature and 'bought' by the beneficiaries of the legislation.

Political and social scientists have made great efforts to study the underlying forces that may drive this legislative operation.'" The results
suggest that pure representative democracy does not consistently
flourish in state houses and that judicial intervention is often warranted to cure legislative defects. 95 Even despite the difficulty of empirically testing or proving the theory,196 many scholars agree that

"special interest groups undoubtedly wield too much collective influence in the legislative process.'

97

Generally, interest group influence is likely to be strongest:
191. See generally Dahl, supra note 187; Eckstein, supra note 187; Lasswell, supra
note 187; Parry, supra note 187.
192. A significant segment of the population seems to agree with this skeptical
view. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65
Tex. L. Rev. 873, 873 (1987) (noting 1982 survey results indicating that over 60% of
respondents agreed with the statement that "government is pretty much run by a few
big interests looking out for themselves" rather than run "for the benefit of all the
people" (citing Mtller, Is Confidence Rebounding?, Pub. Opinion, June-July 1983, at
16, 17)).
193. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The IndependentJudiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & Econ. 875, 877 (1975) (citation omitted).
194. Farber & Frickey, supra note 192, at 877-79.
195. Id at 875 ("Even the more sophisticated recent literature [on interest group
effects on legislation] ... suggests that the flaws in the legislative process are sufficiently serious to warrant cautious judicial intervention.").
196. See id at 879; Sinclair, Purposive Behavior in the U.S. Congress: A Review
Essay, 8 Legis. Stud. Q. 117, 126 (1983).

197. Farber & Frickey, supra note 192, at 925. Although interest groups' "influence
on particular legislation is often difficult to isolate, their overall systemic influence is
indisputable. Although the extent of this influence occasionally is overstated, it nevertheless is quite real." Id at 906.

980
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When the group is attempting to block rather than obtain legislation; when the group's goals are narrow and involve low-visibility
issues; when the group has substantial support from other groups
and public officials, who are themselves important figures and not
merely referees of the group struggle; and when the group is able to
move the issue to 198
a favorable forum such as a sympathetic congressional committee.
Even though organized interest groups are often successful when they
seek legislative enactment of proposals they endorse, 199 interest
groups are most powerful when they face "a proposal [which] moves
forward with nothing more than its merit to support it."' 20 0 In such a
case, "an opposing interest group can easily dispatch [the unrepresented proposal] to oblivion." '0 1 Indeed, "[t]he social science literature indicates that interest groups ... often exercise more power when

they block legislation than when they 2support
it."'2 2 This type of lob03
review.
direct
from
insulated
bying is
This phenomenon has serious consequences in the tort context.
Often, interest groups never have to act because potential tort plaintiffs do not recognize their common interest "in urging reform of a
common law they may not even comprehend. ' 2 4 Accordingly, dispersed and disorganized individuals who may have the greatest stake
in obtaining a right, and may in fact represent a majoritarian consensus on an issue, will be helpless to obtain legislative action if they are
not organized. 2 5 And when organized political groups do bring tort
issues to the attention of the legislatures, the "pressure exerted.., is
generally hostile ' to
change and impedes legislative efforts to enact
06
needed reforms.

Disproportionate interest group pressure "redistributes wealth and
political power away from segments of the population that do not be198. l at 887 (citing Kay L. Schlozman & John T. Tierney, Organized Interests
and American Democracy 314-16, 396-98 (1986)).
199. Cornelius J. Peck, Comments on JudicialCreativity, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 6 (1983)
("The desires of lobbies and pressure groups provide the inspiration for the proposal
of legislation.... Legislation is not adopted merely because it is good; competing
demands for use of limited legislative time are too strong to permit that to happen
with any frequency.").
200. Id at 8.
201. Id at 8-9 ("Faced with organized resistance on one side and no organized support on the other, the choice is obvious to a legislator whose approval is necessary to
obtain release of a bill from committee, particularly if the legislative rules permit secrecy on votes to refer.").
202. Farber & Frickey, supra note 192, at 906.
203. Id at 908.
204. Ursin, supra note 167, at 249 (citation omitted).
205. Farber & Frickey, supra note 192, at 874 ("[L]egislatures speak only for wellorganized groups, and not for the general public.").
206. Ursin, supra note 167, at 249; see Kenneth G. Crawford, The Pressure Boys
(1939); V.O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (5th ed. 1964); Dayton D.
McKean, Pressures on the Legislatures of New Jersey (1938)).
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long to any organized interest group." 2" The influence of special interest groups also undermines the democratic ethos that is vital to the
maintenance of a democratic society." s Paradoxically, this undermining is a direct result of the very restraints on judicial lawmaking that
the Legal Process Model requires in order to preserve respect for underlying tenets of democratic theory. Because of inherent weaknesses
in the legislative process, especially with regard to issues that pit an
organized and financed lobby against a dispersed constituency with no
organized strength, the Legal Process Model's advocacy of judicial restraint in deference to the democratically superior legislature becomes
suspect. Legal Process Model deference is predicated upon false assumptions that legislatures: act in the interest of the majority; have
studied and are knowledgeable about the bills they vote on; and act,
or fail to act, based on an awareness and understanding of court decisions on the issue. 2°
A more realistic view of the legislative process would recognize,
however, that:
what presently blocks the legislative origination of substantive laws
or revision of ambiguous or obsolete statutes is usually either inertia
or the political pressures of one or more powerful groups rather
than the considered decision of the majority. The same political
pressure, of course, can produce legislative change or a veto of a
court-originated or court-revised rule, but doing so will be more difficult once a court has spelled out the need for the rule or revision
than if, as at present, the pressure is applied behind the scenes 210
207. Farber & Frickey, supra note 192, at 906 (citing Mancur Olson, The Logic of
Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1965)).
208. Id at 907.
The successful functioning of a democracy requires voters, and sometimes
government officials, to act in economically irrational ways. Because these
behaviors are not reinforced by economic incentives, they depend on a
somewhat fragile public adherence to a social code. Special interest groups
create the impression that government is simply an arena of self-interest and
thus foster an atmosphere of cynicism that is incompatible with a healthy
democracy.
Ild.
(citations omitted).
Another problem is a "pogo effect," wherein no one "group can afford to drop out
of the contest for government handouts; [because] members of a group that did would
pay the same taxes but receive fewer benefits, thus redistributing income to the remaining contestants." ld at 906.
This pogo effect creates a result like that found in the prisoners dilemma game,
where an individual's rational behavior leads to a result where everyone is worse off.
"This creates a kind of 'race to the bottom,' in which pork-barrel politics displaces
pursuit of the public interest-a situation individuals may deplore even as they find
themselves compelled to participate." Id.
209. Meyer, supra note 174, at 678 (citing Richard Neely, How Courts Govern
America (1981); Luther M. Swygert, In Defense of Judicial Activism, 16 Val. U. L
Rev. 439, 448 (1982)).
210. Id.at 677-78 (citing Cornelius J.Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures
in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 281-82, 286, 293-94 (1963); Neely,
supra note 209, at 23-57).
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From the Reform Model viewpoint, the judicial independence from
political pressure allows courts to make necessary reforms to the law
"when the political processes are unresponsive."21 ' This is vital because "the beneficiaries of... judicial creativity are persons who are
unlikely to have lobbied for legislation that would solve the problem. '2 12 Courts can play a vital role in advancing principled consideration of novel issues, by shifting the burden of "overcoming legislative
inertia.., from those who are unlikely and unable to act, to those who
are organized and capable of acting. '2 13 In fact, justifications for "judicial creativity"-judicial exercise of the lawmaking functions-are
strongest when legislative failure precludes meaningful consideration
of legislative proposals.214 Courts must be allowed to act creatively in
order to overcome the deadening force of special interest groups, the
"impotence" of potential tort plaintiffs with regard to obtaining legislative activity, and the legislative
inertia that tilts the initial balance in
215
favor of the status quo.
Further, the tripartite nature of government addresses the Legal
Process Model's fear that a judiciary unaccountable to the electorate
is incompetent to make new law with broad social policy consequences. But courts are always ultimately accountable to the electorate because anything they do is subject to legislative reconsideration
or veto. 16 Accordingly, one must view "[j]udicial creativity ...

not

[as] a usurpation of legislative power; [but] rather..,
an entirely ap2' 1 7
propriate part of a joint lawmaking responsibility.
State courts are the proper forum to hear the claim at issue. The
state judicial system, the arena in which the right to privacy saw its
greatest development, must be charged with the task of developing
doctrine to protect individuals' rights when legislatures refuse or fail
to act. State courts determine a majority of all legal disputes and accordingly, 218 because they are "both literally and figuratively closest to
211. Ursin, supra note 167, at 250.
212. Peck, supra note 199, at 41.
213. Il at 42. In this regard, Peck discusses the development of common-law recognition of palimony causes of action in California. See id. at 41.
214. See Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law
Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions,70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1995) (noting vital
role of state courts in development of common-law doctrine); Peck, supra note 199, at
12 ("In this country, tort law still is produced primarily by judges following commonlaw traditions. It is not surprising, then, to find that it is an area in which judicial
creativity is apparent.").
215. See Ursin, supra note 167, at 272 (discussing Holmesian views about modifying
common law doctrines).
216. See Cornelius J. Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislaturesin the Reform of
Tort Law, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 281-82, 286, 293-94 (1963).
217. Ursin, supra note 167, at 256.
218. "We should remind ourselves that it is state court decisions which finally determine the overwhelming aggregate of all legal controversies in this nation." Kaye,
supra note 214, at 3 (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., State Supreme Court Judge Ver-
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the people,. . . state courts ...play a vital role in shaping the lives of
'
our citizenry."219
On varied occasions and in different areas of law state courts have
undertaken the challenge to advance the law. These areas include a
shift from contributory to comparative negligencez 20 and a change of
law with regard to exculpatory clauses.221 State courts have stripped
municipal corporations of immunity from liability for the wrongful
acts of their agents acting within the line and scope of their employment, 222 removed restrictions on a wife's ability to sue for loss of consortium,22 3 and recognized a cause of action for loss of parental

consortium. 224

sus United States Supreme Court Justice: A Change in Function and Perspective, 19 U.

Fla. L. Rev. 225, 236 (1966)).
219. Id. at 5. As Chief Judge Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals notes,
"[O]verwhelmingly, our nation's legal disputes are centered in the state courts, which
handle more than ninety-seven percent of the litigation-tens of millions of new filings each year compared to some 250,000 in the federal courts." Id. at 3 (citing National Center for State Courts, State Court Caseload Statistics: Annual Report 1992,
at 3 (1994)).
220. Peck, supra note 199, at 20. The court-induced shift from contributory to comparative negligence demonstrates the power of interest groups in legislative processes.
Lobbyists aided in adoption of comparative negligence statutes. Twenty-three state
legislatures adopted the comparative negligence doctrine, a figure that might fly in the
face of arguments that the question is better decided by a court. Id. But the lobbyists
sought adoption of comparative negligence for reasons other than its superiority on
the merits. Id. Insurance interests sought to avoid adoption of no-fault automobile
accident reparation plans, and believed that comparative negligence schemes,
although not ideal for their interests, would be better for them than the no-fault paradigm. As one commentator has noted, "[t]he legislative adoption of comparative negligence thus stands as an illustration of how interested lobbyists can achieve action
that did not occur solely upon consideration of reform on its merits." Id
221. This rule change was made by the Alabama Supreme Court in Lloyd v. Service
Corp. of Ala., 453 So. 2d 735, (Ala. 1984), where the court stated that "it is clearly
within the power of the judiciary, and at times, appropriate for the judiciary, to
change an established rule of law." d at 740.
222. Jackson v. City of Florence, 320 So. 2d 68, 73-74 (Ala. 1975).
223. Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462, 465 (Alaska 1974) ("We find no wisdom in
abdicating to the legislature our essential function of re-evaluating common-law concepts in the light of present day realities.... We are of the view that in ...this
litigation it would be inappropriate for this court to wait for legislative action.").
224. See, e.g., Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Son's, Inc., 413 NE.2d 690, 695-96
(Mass. 1980). In recognizing a cause of action for loss of parental consortium, the
court stated that, "In a field long left to the common law, change may well come
about by the same medium of development. Sensible reform can here be achieved
without the articulation of detail or the creation of administrative mechanisms that
customarily come about by legislative enactment."' Id (quoting Diaz v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 302 N.E.2d 555, 563 (Mass. 1973)). The court perceived that the legislature could
cure any ill effects of the court's extension of the law, stating that "[iun the end the
Legislature may say that we have mistaken the present public understanding of the
nature of the [parent-child] relation, but that we cannot now divine or anticipate." Id.
at 696 (quoting Diaz, 302 N.E.2d at 563-64).
In Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. 1981), the court addressed the criticism
that a flood of plaintiffs might arise if the doctrine were recognized, and reiterated the
lower appellate courts' statement that "[t]he rights of a new class of tort plaintiffs
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A strong argument on behalf of the courts' ability to break new
ground in its interpretation of novel situations is found in the dissenting opinion in Turpin v. Sortini.2 5 Stating that the argument of judi'' 6
cial restraint in deference to the legislature "is really out of vogue, 12
the judge cited a litany of California cases where courts extended,
modified, or otherwise changed existing law.2 2 7 He also relied on the
reasoned arguments of the preeminent tort scholar of this century,
Dean Prosser, who remarked:
The law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of its development are never set. When it becomes clear that the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the
defendant, the mere fact that the
2 8 claim is novel will not of itself
operate as a bar to the remedy.

2

should be forthrightly judged on their own merits, rather than engaging in gloomy
speculation as to where it will all end." Id. at 426 (quoting Berger, 267 N.W.2d 124,

129 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)); see also Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 265-66 (Iowa
1981) (noting that development of the common law is within the proper sphere of the
court's authority); Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190, 193 (Wash. 1984) (en
banc) (observing the development of the law and expressing concern that deferring to
the legislature would be abdicating the court's "responsibility to reform the common
law to meet the evolving standards of justice"); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344
N.W.2d 513, 514 (Wis. 1984) (noting that the "'genius of the common law is its ability
to adapt itself to the changing needs of society"' and stating that "resolution of
[whether a cause of action for loss of parental consortium should be recognized] is yet
another step along the evolution of how the courts of this state views of the changing
nature of the family unit" (quoting Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 150
N.W.2d 137, 141 (Wis. 1967))).
225. 174 Cal. Rptr. 128, 133 (Ct. App. 1981) (Andreen, J., dissenting), rev'd, 643
P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982) (en banc).
226. Id. at 135.
227. IL Among the cases cited are People v. Drew, 583 P.2d 1318 (Cal. 1978)
(overturning M'Naghten test); Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977) (en banc)
(recognizing "private attorney general doctrine"); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226
(Cal. 1975) (en banc) (adopting comparative negligence rule); Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1974) (en banc) (recognizing spousal action for
loss of consortium); Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (en banc) (eliminating distinctions between trespasees, licensees, and invitees in broadening liability
of negligent land owners); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal.
1963) (en banc) (creating strict products liability); Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist.,
359 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1961) (en banc) (abrogating law of governmental immunity); Silva
v. Providence Hosp. of Oakland, 97 P.2d 798 (Cal. 1939) (en banc) (overruling charitable immunity doctrine).
228. William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 1, at 3-4 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter Prosser 4th ed.] (footnotes omitted), cited in Turpin, 174 Cal. Rptr. at
135-36. Professor Prosser full comments are as follows:
New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and the progress of
the common law is marked by many cases of first impression, in which the
court has struck out boldly to create a new cause of action, where none had
been recognized before. The intentional infliction of mental suffering, the
obstruction of the plaintiff's right to go where he likes, the invasion of his
right of privacy, the denial of his right to vote, the conveyance of land to
defeat a title, the infliction of prenatal injuries, the alienation of the affections of a parent, and injury to a man's reputation by entering him in a
rigged television contest, to name only a few instances, could not be fitted
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Some commentators have advocated taking these urgings one step farther and having courts officially adopt an expanded, activist role when
considering novel legal issues: 2 9
Expansion of the role of the courts beyond that permitted by notions of legislative primacy and myopic concentration on the factual
matrix of a particular litigation can conform the legal system (legislative, executive, and judicial) more nearly to the needs of those
who are governed by it.... [Cqourts [should] be authorized, when
appropriate, to look beyond the particular litigants and to make
substantive law of equal effect with, or in modification of, statute
and to change court-made rules that could have been, but were not,
changed by the legislature, subject, however, as to either, to legislative veto or recall.3 °
Courts as institutions should not be uncomfortable adopting a lawmaking function. "The plain and simple fact is that judges, of necessity, must from time to time make, rather than interpret, law and that
they are perfectly justified in so doing. Indeed, no clear line actually
can be drawn between making and interpreting law and the distinction
is therefore illusory."'231 That courts in fact do accept this role is
borne out in practice. "Every day.., state courts delineate the limits
of tort liability, thereby defining socially acceptable conduct."'
The Reform Model advocates judicial creativity in areas "when ...
political processes are unresponsive."1233 With this in mind, part IV

examines legislative and judicial attempts to vest individuals with protectable rights in personal information, and analyzes these attempts in
light of Reform Model imperatives.
IV. A "REFORM" MINDED APPROACH TO JUDICIAL PROTECTION
OF PERSONAL INFORMATION

As noted above, the Reform Model advocates an active lawmaking
role for the judiciary in situations where interest group pressure distorts legislative consideration of an issue. This part demonstrates that
interest group pressure has, in fact, distorted legislative consideration

of individuals' rights in personal information. Accordingly, it argues
into any accepted classifications when they first arose, but nevertheless have
been held to be torts. The law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of
its development are never set. When it becomes clear that the plaintiff's
interests are entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is novel will not of itself operate as a bar to
the remedy.

Prosser, 4th ed., supra, §1, at 3-4.
229. Meyer, supra note 174, at 677.

230. Id

231. Robert N. Clinton, Judges Must Make Law: A Realistic Appraisal of the Judicial Function in a DemocraticSociety, 67 Iowa L Rev. 711, 711 (1982).

232. Kaye, supra note 214, at 6-7 (citing examples of New York courts' development of common law negligence liability).
233. Ursin, supra note 167, at 250.
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that courts should face the issue on its merits. After examining three
cases in which courts failed to act in the Reform Model sense and
refused to make what would have been principled extensions of existing privacy doctrine, it demonstrates the legal basis upon which
these and other courts could extend privacy protection to rights in
personal information. Finally, this part presents privacy cases in
which courts acted in a "reform" sense to develop the very right to
privacy which now forms the basis upon which courts should, in light
of social and technological change, protect individuals' rights in personal information. In this manner, this part demonstrates that courts
expanding common law privacy protection to personal information
will in fact be acting consistently with the reasoned development of
privacy doctrine throughout the twentieth century.
A. Interest Group Effects on PersonalInformation
Legislative Proposals
As noted in part III, the Reform Model demonstrates that interest
groups distort legislative processes, especially in situations where they
block, rather than promote, legislative activity.234 Accordingly, because they would be blocking rather than advocating legislation, interest groups' power would be particularly strong with regard to
proposals to vest individuals with rights in personal information.235
Recent examples in fact bear out the difficulties in this arena.
A stark example of legislative process failure in the context of individuals' rights in personal information was recently played out in the
California legislature. State Senator Steve Peace, Chairman of the
California Senate Committee on Energy, Utilities and Communications introduced a bill that would have vested in individuals an enforceable right in their personal information.236 The pertinent portion
of the bill provided that "[n]o person or corporation may use or distribute for profit any personal information concerning a person without that person's written consent. Such information includes, but is
not limited to, an individual's credit history, finances, medical history,
purchases, and travel patterns." 7 The bill contained the following
legislative finding concerning the California right to privacy:
Advances in technology have made it easier to create, acquire,
and analyze detailed personal information about an individual;
234. See supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text.
235. Id-("[G]roup influence is likely to be strongest when the group is attempting
to block rather than obtain legislation.... ." (citing Schlozman & Tierney, supra note
198, at 314-15, 395-96)).
236. S. 1659, Cal. 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Feb. 21, 1996) amended Sept. 21, 1996. See
Julie Forster, California, Minnesota and New York Lawmakers Push Internet Privacy
Bills, West's Legal News, Mar. 15, 1996, at 1310, available in Westlaw 1996 WL
259030.
237. See Forster, supra note 236.
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[p]ersonal information, including information about a person's financial history, shopping habits, medical history, and travel patterns, is continuously being created; [t]he unauthorized use of
personal information concerning an individual is an infringement
upon that individual's right to privacy.2M
The bill was proposed in reaction to the proliferation of online services and their capacity to gather and store personal information, but
was drafted to cover personal information gathered and stored in any
manner.3 9 Further, the bill was proposed against the backdrop of the
California Constitution which provides that all people have certain inalienable rights, including the right to privacy.24 Senator Peace called
the bill "a simple implementation of California's existing constitutional protection of privacy.""24
When the bill was introduced in February, 1996, there were predictions that the bill would not be "likely to move out of committee due
to corporate opposition which has mustered a formidable lobbying
presence." 42 A committee consultant who helped draft the bill explained how interest groups dominate consideration of such a
measure:
The organized constituency in Sacramento [California's capital] is
the larger business interests and they are against the bill.... There
aren't any organized constituencies in support of the bill. They're
just ordinary people. They send us mail and tell us, 'We agree with
you completely,' but they are not organized in any effective way up
here. You can't counterbalance2 43
the opposition, and because of that
it will be a tough bill to [pass].
Indeed, privacy commentators noted that the legislation "will be lobbied to the max-ferociously.... The legislation... does not have an
easy road ahead of it." 244 Senator Peace himself understood from the
start that his bill faced an uphill battle," 5 but nonetheless desired to
get the fight underway: "Every day those computers keep cranking
out of our control, more information is absorbed, more mistakes are
made, and the task of bringing things back under control just gets bigger and bigger."'
These predictions were borne out in practice. Soon after it was introduced, the bill was "bombarded" by commercial enterprise interest
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See Cal. Coast. art. 1, § 1.
241. Forster, supra note 236.
242. Id.
243. Id. (quoting Randy Chinn, consultant to California Senate Committee on Energy, Utilities and Communications).
244. Id (quoting Beth Givens, Project Director of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse at the University of San Diego School of Law).
245. Rep. Steve Peace, Editorial,San Diego Union-Trib., Feb. 21, 1996, at B9 (acknowledging that it would take a long time before his privacy bill is enacted).
246. Id.
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groups, led by the large national credit reporting agencies.24 7 A compromise was forced, and now the bill merely creates a task force, comprised of three Senators and three Assemblymen, charged with
evaluating how current California law conforms with the privacy protection mandate of the state constitution. 4 8 The task force's report is
due in March 1998, in time for that year's legislative session. 249 There
was minimal press coverage of the initial proposal, and no coverage of
the compromise that resulted after commercial interests exerted
pressure.250
25
This experience is common with regard to consumer legislation. 2 31
2
Similar proposals introduced in the New Jersey25 and New York
state legislatures in early 1996 were also expected to "languish[ ] in
committee. '254 Massachusetts state legislators have announced their
intention to introduce a255similar proposal in their 1997 session, which
commences in January.
The role of interest groups in determination of personal information issues is not new. As mentioned in part II, Congress in 1977 considered the privacy implications of mailing list sales, and held hearings
on the issue. The direct marketing industry made a strong showing at
these hearings, and their testimony and proposals pervade the Commission's report.25 6
Direct-marketers testified at length to the 1977 Privacy Commission
about the economic necessity of mailing list profiling, and sought to
convince them that the industry should be left to police itself because
the industry itself would want to discriminate among consumers with
varying levels of privacy concerns. "[T]he best direct-mail campaign is
the one that mails the least. This is a business necessity .... A piece
of mail to an individual who doesn't want to buy is wasted, and to
247. Telephone Interview with Randy Chinn, consultant to California Senate Committee on Energy, Utilities and Communication (Oct. 11, 1996) [hereinafter Telephone Interview].
248. S. 1659, Cal. 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Feb. 21, 1996), amended Sept. 21, 1996.

249. Id.
250. See Telephone Interview, supra note 247.
251. Forster, supra note 236.

252. The New Jersey proposal, Senate Bill, No. 795, was introduced on February 15,
1996. It sought specifically to regulate sale of mailing lists, and proposed that "[n]o
person, including any public or private entity, shall rent, sell or otherwise release the
names, addresses, or telephone numbers of individuals to any other person for use in
commercial solicitation without the prior written or electronic consent of those individuals." S. 795, 207th Leg. (Feb. 15, 1996).
253. Forster, supra note 236.
254. Id.
255. Higgins, supra note 37, at 1. The citizen who motivated her legislator to pro-

pose the legislation complained of "the widespread attitude that there's nothing we
can do about these mailings and calls, that they are somehow part of the air we
breathe and the water we drink." Id.

256. See Posch, supra note 34, at 2. As one direct marketing insider describes the
effort: "DMA leaders taught and sold the Commission... and set in place the setpiece of self-regulation." Id. at 2-3.
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direct mailers the elimination of this kind of waste is absolutely essential.''z57 Self-regulation has not proven successful, however. - Additionally, the Fair Credit Reporting Act's current inability to
adequately safeguard personal privacy is attributable to provisions
that were inserted at the behest of an aggressive commercial interest
lobby- 5 9
Although these events cannot conclusively prove that interest
groups will always defeat meaningful consideration of proposals to establish legal rights in personal information, they do shed clear light on
the difficulty of passing such proposals in the face of organized and
financially powerful interest groups.
B.

Unsuccessful Attempts To Apply the Appropriation Tort To
Prevent Nonconsensual Dissemination of
PersonalInformation

Plaintiffs in three separate cases have unsuccessfully attempted to
apply some form of the appropriation tort to stop unauthorized dissemination of personal information. This part examines these decisions and suggests that a legitimate basis exists for expanding existing
common law privacy doctrine to protect against unauthorized dissemination of personal information.
1. Shibley v. 7me
In Shibley v. Time, Inc., °a 1977 decision that has been widely criticized, 261 plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring Time Magazine to
obtain subscriber consent before selling subscription lists.262 The
Ohio Court of Appeals held that the magazine's sale of the lists to
direct mail advertisers without first obtaining the subscribers' consent
was not an invasion of privacy, even if the practice amounted to sale
of "personality profiles," because the information was used only to
determine what type of advertisement would be sent.263
The plaintiffs attempted to fit their claim within the "appropriation"
branch of the right to privacy, which, under Ohio common law, prohibits the "unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality." 4 Plaintiffs argued that defendants' sale of subscription lists
257. Privacy Comm'n, supra note 40, at 135 (quoting testimony of Association of
American Publishers).

258. See supra notes 75-92 and accompanying text (detailing ineffective self-regulation in direct-marketing industry).
259. See supra note 121.
260. 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977).
261. See Reidenberg, Fortress or Frontier,supra note 63, at 216; Graham, supra

note 43, at 1413; Shorr, supra note 44, at 338. For a comprehensive discussion of
Shibley and other related cases, see Graham, supra note 43, at 1413-17.
262. 341 N.E.2d at 337. Plaintiffs also sought damages and costs. Id.

263. Id at 339-40.
264. Id. at 339 (quoting Housh, 133 N.E.2d at 341).
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amounted to sales of "personality profiles," which subjected the subscribers to solicitations from direct mail advertisers.265 Plaintiffs then,
somewhat vaguely, alleged that this practice amounted to an invasion
of privacy that was not consented to nor made part of the original
subscription contract. 266 The court dismissed this argument on two
questionable grounds. First it held that the appropriation tort only
applies where the plaintiff's name or likeness is displayed to the public. 267 This argument is suspect, however, because it is arguable
whether, once the information is spread to a multitude of third-parties, it might be considered "displayed" for the purposes of the rule;
also, not
all jurisdictions require publicity as such in misappropriation
268
cases.

Second, the court held that plaintiffs have no expectation of privacy
in their mailboxes.269 In so holding, the court looked to the Ohio legislature's provision allowing third parties to compile and sell lists of
the names and addresses of motor vehicle registrants. The court held
that this act implied that an individual's rights of privacy are not compromised by sale of personal information.27 ° The court also relied
upon Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,2 71 a federal case
that found constitutional a New York statute that authorized the New
York2 72State Department of Motor Vehicles to sell driver registration
lists.
In dismissing the complaint, the Lamont court used the following language, upon which the Shibley court relied heavily:
265. Id Plaintiffs alleged that buyers of the lists drew inferences about the "financial position, social habits, and general personality of the persons on the lists by virtue
of the fact that they subscribe to certain publications and that this information is then
used in determining the type of advertisement to be sent." Id.
266. Id It is worth noting that the plaintiffs seemed to erroneously place the thrust
of their complaint on the fact that they received unwanted solicitations, rather than
on the sale of the information by the magazine to the advertiser in the first place. As
one commentator has noted, "Plaintiff obfuscated the privacy question by complaining that the sale of personality profiles subjected magazine subscribers to solicitations from direct mail advertisers." Graham, supra note 157, at 1413.
267. Shibley, 341 N.E.2d at 339. The court stated "[i]t is clear from a reading of the
authorities dealing with invasion of privacy that the 'appropriation or exploitation of
one's personality' referred to ...those situations where the plaintiff's name or likeness is displayed to the public to indicate that the plaintiff indorses the defendant's
product or business." Id. (citing W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 117 (4th ed. 1971)). The
court then summarily dismissed the argument by stating that "[t]he activity complained of here does not fall within that classification." Id.
268. See McCarthy, supra note 155, § 6.1; Reidenberg, Fortress or Frontier,supra
note 63, at 226-27.
269. Shibley, 341 N.E.2d at 339-40.
270. Id. at 339 (referring to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4503.26 (Anderson 1993)).
271. 269 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 915 (1968).
272. Id at 884. In Lamont, the plaintiff claimed that subjecting motor vehicle registrants to the kind of solicitation that would flow from sale of registration lists was a
"violation of the right to privacy and constitute[d] deprivation of... liberty and property under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
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The mail box, however noxious its advertising contents often seem
to judges as well as other people, is hardly the kind of enclave that
requires constitutional defense to protect 'the privacies of life.' The
short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can ... is an
acceptable 27burden,
at least so far as the Constitution is
3
concerned.
Shibley's reliance on Lamont is incorrect for two reasons. First, Lamont dealt with a constitutional right of the individual to privacy as
against the state; it did not address relations between private actors.
This distinction is clear in cases and the literature. 7 4 Second, the
Shibley court focused only on the end-use of the information, citing
precedent that mail solicitation does not violate individuals' privacy.
Regardless of whether or not the end-use may infringe on privacy
rights, the end-use is not the violation in these cases. Rather, it is the
sale of the information to the end-users in the first place that constitutes the tortious appropriation of the plaintiffs personality. 27s Accordingly, whether there is an expectation of privacy in the mailbox is
irrelevant to the claim asserted by plaintiffs in Shibley.2 76
Finally, as discussed above, the court noted its incompetence to
even handle the question presented in the first place. 27
2.

Dwyer v. American Express

A recent Illinois case, Dwyer v. American Express Co.,2 s reconsidered the sale of personal information and relied heavily upon Shibley.
Similar to Shibley, the Dwyer complaint alleged that American Express, through its practice of compiling and selling lists of
cardmembers names and addresses arranged by "personality profiles,"
invaded the cardmembers' privacy and violated the Illinois Consumer
Fraud statute.2 7 9 The Illinois Appeals Court affirmed the trial court's
States Constitution." Id. at 882. The Lamont court found that there was no "captive
quality" in the solicitation. Id at 883.
273. Id.
274. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
275. See Reidenberg, supra note 63, at 226; Graham, supra note 43, at 1417; Shorr,
supra note 44, at 1831 & n.369.
276. As to Shibley's logic, Professor Reidenberg points out: i[i]n general, courts do
not require an expectation of privacy or publicity as elements of this invasion of privacy. The Shibley court did not, in fact, assess whether the mailing list reflected Shibley's personality." Reidenberg, Fortressor Frontier,supra note 63, at 226-27.
277. See supra note 163 and accompanying text, recounting deference to legislature
exercised by Shibley court.
278. 652 N.E.2d 1351 (MII.App. Ct. 1995).
279. Id at 1356. Plaintiffs' claim grew out of a May 1992 settlement between
American Express and the New York State Attorney General's Office whereby
American Express agreed to disclose to all cardmembers the fact that it compiled
information from cardmember card usage and sold that information to marketers and
merchants. It further agreed to give cardmembers the opportunity to "opt out" of
having their names included on these lists. Peter Pae, American Express Co. Dis-
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grant of defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim."'
The Illinois Supreme Court denied certiorari.s
Plaintiffs made three unsuccessful claims. The first was a privacy
claim fashioned under the intrusion upon seclusion tort.2" Plaintiffs'
second claim was fashioned under Illinois' Consumer Fraud statute.283
The plaintiffs' third claim was brought under the appropriation tort,
recognized at common law in Illinois.' The court cited the Restatement's position that the purpose of the tort is to protect the "interest
of the individual in the exclusive use of his own identity, in so far as it
is represented by his name or likeness. ' 2 35 Defendant argued rental
of the information did not interfere with plaintiff's "exclusive use of
his own identity"; the names themselves had no value; and if there is
in fact value in the list, defendants created such value through their
efforts to compile the information and make aggregate lists.2 86 Plain-

closes It Gives Merchants Data on Cardholders'Habits, Wall St. J., May 14, 1992, at
A3.
According to news articles released at the time of the settlement, American Express categorized and ranked cardmembers into six tiers based on spending habits
(e.g., "Rodeo Drive Chic" or "Value Oriented"). Id. To achieve this categorization,
American Express analyzed "where [cardmembers] shop and how much they spend,
and also consider[ed] behavioral characteristics and spending histories." Dwyer, 652
N.E.2d at 1353.
American Express also created lists to target cardmembers who purchase specific
types of items, and cardmembers who fell into various categories of shoppers, including "mail-order apparel buyers, home-improvement shoppers, electronics shoppers,
luxury lodgers, card members with children, skiers, frequent business travelers, resort
users, Asian/European travelers, luxury European car owners, or recent movers." Id.
280. ld. at 1357.
281. 662 N.E.2d 423 (IlM. 1996).
282. The elements of intrusion upon seclusion under Illinois law are: 1) unauthorized intrusion or prying into defendant's seclusion; 2) intrusion which is objectionable
to a reasonable man; 3) intrusion into a private matter; and 4) causation of anguish
and suffering. Id. at 1354 (citing Melvin v. Buling, 490 N.E.2d 1011, 1013-14 (IM.App.
Ct. 1986)).
The court held that plaintiffs failed to establish the first element, "unauthorized
intrusion," reasoning that when the cardmembers use the card, they are "voluntarily,
and necessarily, giving information to defendants that, if analyzed, will reveal a cardholder's spending habits and shopping preferences." Id.
283. The court dismissed this claim because the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act only
provided private causes of action to "[a]ny person who suffers damage as a result of a
violation of th[e] Act." lId at 1357 (quoting 815 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 505/10a(a) (West
1992)). Because plaintiffs did not, and could not, allege damage from disclosure of
this sort of information, their claim under the act was dismissed as well. Id.
284. The elements of tortious appropriation under Illinois law are: 1) appropriation, 2) without consent, 3) of one's name or likeness, 4) for another's use or benefit.
Id. at 1355. This definition is fairly consistent with that of the Restatement and the
majority of jurisdictions. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(C) (1977); McCarthy, supra note 155, §§ 6.1-.15.
285. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(C) cmat. a (1977)).
286. Id. at 1356.

19961

PERSONAL INFORMATION

tiffs countered by citing cases finding appropriation even where the
name or likeness is used for a non-commercial purpose.22s
The court, however, looked no further than Shibley to decide the
case." 8 Without explaining Shibley's rationale for dismissing the
appropriation claim, the court dismissed plaintiffs' claim on the
ground that there is no value in one name.2s9 The court ruled that the
defendants created the valuable product when they analyzed the
cardmember information and compiled aggregate lists of
cardmembers' names.29
The Shibley court, however, based no part of its decision on the
relative value of individual names versus a compiled list of names.
Accordingly, the Dwyer court based its dismissal of the appropriation
claim on precedent that does not exist. Despite Dwyer's citation to
Shibley, no precedent supports its argument that there can be no appropriation because there is no value in a single name.
3. Avrahami v. U.S. News & World Report
In the most recent court case of this nature, Avrahami v. U.S. News
& World Report,29 a subscriber to U.S. News & World Report ("U.S.
News") sued the magazine because it sold his name and address to
Smithsonian Magazine without his consent .2 1 The plaintiff, Ram
Avrahami, claimed that he has a property right in his name, and that
U.S. News violated this right by renting his name and address to
Smithsonian without first obtaining his consent.293 Avrahami's claim
was based on a Virginia statute stating that no one may use another
person's name, portrait, or picture "for advertising purposes or for the
purposes of trade" without written consent.29 The case was dismissed
287. Id. (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E2d 454 (Ohio
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562 (1977)); Douglass v. Hustler Magazine,
769 F.2d 1128, 1138 (7th Cir. 1985); Annerino v. Dell Publ'g Co., 149 N.E.2d 761 (1ll.
App. Ct. 1957); Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 106 N.E.2d 742 (IM.App. CL 1952).
288. After reciting the parties' arguments, the court simply stated: "Even more
persuasive is Shibley v. 7une. .. ." Id. It provided neither an explanation of Shibley's
reasoning nor any independent reasoning to dismiss the appropriation claim.
289. Id.
290. Id
291. Avrahami v. U.S. News & World Rep., Inc., No. 96-203, slip op. (Cir. Ct. Arlington County June 13, 1996).
292. Bruce Knecht, Privacy: Junk-Mail Hater Seeks Profits from the Sale of His

Name, Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1995, at B1.
293. Id.Avrahami's suit is different from Shibley and Dwyer because he focuses his

claim, at least in part, on an asserted property right in his name or personality.
Avrahami's claim is based on the Virginia appropriation statute, which has been interpreted by the Virginia Supreme Court as protecting an individual's property right in
name and likeness. See Lavery v. Automation Mgmt. Consultants, Inc., 360 S.E.2d
336,342 (Va. 1987) (holding "that Code § 8.01-40(A) creates in an individual a species
of property right in their [sic] name and likeness").
294. The statute, which codifies the common law appropriation tort, reads:
§ 8.01-40: Unauthorized use of name or picture of any person; exemplary
damages...
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upon U.S. News's motion on June 13, 1996, because it was discovered
that in order to track U.S. News' sale of his name, Avrahami had intentionally misspelled his name as "Avrahani."2 95 Accordingly, the
court found that even if Avrahami were to have a property right in his
own name-a point on which the court expressed no opinion-he certainly did not have such a right in someone else's, or in a fictional,
name. Avrahami has filed a petition for appeal to the Virginia
Supreme Court.296 As expected, the DMA has shown great interest in
the case.297
As Shibley, Dwyer, and Avrahami demonstrate, the appropriation
tort, which potentially could protect against the unwanted sale of personal information-in fact, on its face it seems to directly apply-has
yet to be successfully utilized to protect individuals in this regard.
C. Appropriationand Publicity Bases for Protection of Individual
Rights in PersonalInformation
Despite the results in Shibley, Dwyer, and Avrahami, both the appropriation tort and the right of publicity, each of which has a firm
basis in property, provide a basis from which courts can vest individuals with a right against the unauthorized sale of personal information. 98 In light of interest group problems described above 9 9 courts
should follow the Reform Model of judicial activism and seek to extend existing common law privacy protection. As this section suggests, a principled basis exists for that extension. 00 This section
A. Any person whose name, portrait, or picture is used without having first
obtained the written consent of such person... for advertising purposes or
for the purposes of trade, such person may maintain a suit in equity against
the person, firm, or corporation so using such person's name, portrait, or
picture to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover
damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use.
Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-40 (Michie 1994).
295. Avrahami v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., In Chancery No. 96-203, slip op.
at 21 (Cir. Ct. Arlington County June 13, 1996).
296. Doug Henschen, Avrahami Seeks Appeal of U.S. News Case, Direct Marketing
News, Sept. 30, 1996, at 1.
297. Knecht, supra note 292, at B5.
298. See Shorr, supra note 44, at 1819 (arguing that "the theory of property underlying the misappropriation tort and the right of publicity provides the strongest legal
foundation for the recognition of property rights in personal information");
299. See supra notes 234-59 (discussing interest group distortion of legislative
processes with regard to proposals to vest individuals with rights in personal
information).
300. Shorr, supra note 44, at 1819 ("A reasonable extension of these torts-consistent with their historical origins and reflective of modem contingencies-seems ideally suited to defending personal privacy from credit bureau invasions."); see supra
note 157 (compiling commentators who advocate extension of appropriation and publicity doctrine to personal information sales).
Some have argued that the restrictions that these torts would place on information
dissemination would run afoul of the First Amendment. See Short, supra note 44, at
1846-49 (summarizing and analyzing constitutional objections to statute vesting indi-
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briefly describes the misappropriation tort and the right to publicity,
and examines how the theories underlying these torts justify extension
of the law to cover unauthorized dissemination of personal
information.
In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis wrote a groundbreaking law review article advocating the creation of a right to privacy. 301 They argued for protection of the individual's "right to be let
alone."3 0° This right extended the common law protection of the
body, reflected in the torts of assault and battery, to recognition and
protection of personality;
of "man's spiritual nature,... his feelings
30 3
and his intellect.
New York was one of the first states to consider the proposed doctrine, and it was not receptive to the theory. Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co.301 involved the defendant's unauthorized use of
plaintiff's picture in a flour advertisement. The plaintiff alleged that
defendant's use constituted misappropriation of her portrait. The
New York Court of Appeals rejected the doctrine despite its acceptance by the two lower courts that heard the case.3 5 The Court of
Appeals denied the existence of any common law right of privacy and
expressed concern over the flood of litigation that it believed would
follow recognition of such a right.3" 6 It concluded that such a signifi-7
cant change in the law would have to be made by the legislature.3
The dissenting opinion advocated forcefully for adoption of the
doctrine.30 s
viduals with rights in personal information). A number of commentators, however,
have argued convincingly that restrictions would survive First Amendment scrutiny
because of the distinct commercial nature of the speech involved. Graham, supra
note 43, at 1434-38 (analyzing Supreme Court commercial speech doctrine and concluding that limited tort-based restrictions on commercial dissemination of personal
information would survive First Amendment scrutiny); Shorr, supra note 44, at 184649 (suggesting Constitutionality of proposed statute which vests individuals with initial rights in personal information and creates framework for personal information
contract scheme).
301. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.L Rev.
193 (1890). The article reviewed cases where relief had "been afforded on the basis of
defamation, or breach of confidence, or of implied contract, in the publication of letters, portraits and the like." John W. Wade et aL, Prosser, Wade and Schwartz's Cases
and Materials on Torts 947 (9th ed. 1994). The article broke new ground by proposing
that these cases really were based on a right to privacy. Id.
302. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 301, at 195 (quoting T. Cooley, A Treatise on
the Law of Torts 29 (1888)).
303. Id at 193.
304. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
305. See 71 N.Y.S. 876, 881 (App. Div. 1901); 65 N.Y.S. 1109, 1113 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
306. 64 N.E. at 443.
307. Id at 443-44.
308. See infra notes 340-46 (noting Judge Gray's forceful arguments in dissent
which recounted the flexibility of common law and advocated its extension to recognize what has now come to be known as the appropriation form of privacy invasion).
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In response to the Roberson decision, the New York legislature
passed laws prohibiting the use of the name, portrait, or picture of any
living person for "advertising purposes" or for "purposes of trade"
without prior written consent. 0 9 New York's privacy law has, for the
most part, been constrained with little variation to the terms of these
statutes since their initial passage. 31° Accordingly, there is no common law right to privacy in New York,31 ' and any claim for relief must
demonstrate that the defendant's invasion or appropriation was for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade.3
The Georgia Supreme Court was the first state high court to recognize the right to privacy. In Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance
Co.,3 3 the defendant used plaintiff's name and picture in an advertisement along with language purportedly from the plaintiff suggesting
plaintiff's endorsement of defendant's product. 314 The Georgia
Supreme Court fully accepted Warren and Brandeis's reasoning, rejected Roberson, and recognized the right to privacy.315 By the 1930s,
the doctrine was generally accepted throughout the country.316 The
right of privacy now is "clearly
recognized, in one form or another, in
'317
all but two or three states.
309. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996).
310. See J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition
§ 28.0414], at 28-37 (3d ed. 1996) (noting that New York courts have refused to find a
common law right to privacy and that all privacy rights "must fit, if at all, within the
1903 ...statute").

In 1995, however, the legislature amended the statute to cover appropriation of a
person's voice. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51 (amended by 1995 N.Y. Laws ch. 674, § 1).
311. See Howell v. New York Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 703 (1993) (noting that New
York has "no common law of privacy" and asserting that adoption of such a right is
"best left to the Legislature"); see also Kent Greenawalt, New York's Right of Privacy:
The Need for Change, 42 Brook. L. Rev. 159, 162 n.13 (1975) (attacking Roberson as
wrongly decided and asserting that the legislative response to Roberson should not be
interpreted as preempting the entire privacy field and disabling the court's ability to
recognize common law privacy); William S. Gyves, The Right to Privacy One Hundred
Years Later: New York Stands Firm as the World and Law Around It Change, 64 St.
John's L. Rev. 315, 325-26, 333 (1990) (criticizing the rigidity and inflexibility of New
York courts in their unwillingness to expand common law doctrine to recognize common law right to privacy).
312. See Frank v. National Broadcasting Co., 506 N.Y.S.2d 869, 871 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1986) (holding that the use of comedic character in skit on Saturday Night Live
with same first name and occupation as plaintiff not actionable use in "trade" under
statute); Moreno v. Time, Inc., 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2196, 2200 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1985) (holding that a comedic impersonation in a theatrical television broadcast is not
for the "purposes of trade" within the meaning of the New York privacy statute). See
generally Beverly v. Choices Women's Medical Ctr., Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275, 278 (N.Y.
1991) (explaining that "advertising purposes" and "for purposes of trade" in statute
are distinct and give rise to separate invasions).
313. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
314. Id-at 68-69.
315. It.at 77-81.
316. See McCarthy, supra note 155, §§ 6.1-.15 (detailing states' recognition of privacy rights).
317. Wade, et. al., supra note 301, at 948.

1996]

PERSONAL INFORMATION

The causes of action asserted in both Roberson and Pavesich are
38
what Prosser would later characterize as the appropriation tort. '
This tort basically prohibits one from appropriating another's name or
likeness without consent. 31 9 Accordingly, it appears to closely fit the

sale of personal information. Indeed, as one commentator has stated
with regard to sale of personal information, "the buying and selling of
individuals' addresses and other characteristics without their consent
violates the privacy principle against exploiting a person's name, face,

or personal facts for another's profit.

32 °

Other commentators have

suggested the potential applicability of the appropriation tort to the

sale of personal information. For example, Professor Reidenberg suggests the possibility of linking personality (upon which the tort is

built) with personal information.32 '

As mentioned above, statutes in some states limit recovery to commercial appropriation of one's name or likeness.32 2 Other states allow
recovery for noncommercial appropriations.32 3 The appropriation
318. This tort is defined as follows: "One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy." Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652(C) (1977).
319. See id. § 652(C) cmt. b, illus. 4, 5 & cmt. c.
320. Robert E. Smith, Privacy: How to Protect What's Left of It 125 (1979).
321. Reidenberg, Fortressor Frontier,supra note 63, at 225-27 & n.177 (citing Shibley v. Time, 341 N.E.2d 337, 339-40 (Ohio CL App. 1975) and Arrington v. New York
Times, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1323-24 (N.Y. 1982) to support "the view that § 51 of the
N.Y. Civil Rights Law should be applicable to sales of name-linked information").
Professor Reidenberg suggests a basis in privacy law for exactly the property right
sought to be established here:
Although the use of a name and address in itself. . . might not constitute an
appropriation of that individual's personality, if the degree of personal information portrays aspects of the individual's lifestyle (e.g., wine collecting
based on a list of all wealthy wine drinkers with an affinity for fine French
cognac), the information profile could be considered a reflection of the individual's personality. As such, it might thus be within the scope of this protection. In these instances, the right would restrict the use giving rise to
commercial gain rather than the collection or storage of that personal
information.
Id.at 226.
In fact, another respected privacy scholar predicts that the law will adapt and recognize new privacy rights in personal information in the same way that it embraced the
appropriation and publicity torts at the beginning of the twentieth century. Alan
Westin, Consumer Privacy Protection: Ten Predictions,Mobius, February, 1992 (predicting that the law "will construct a similar concept for consumer personal profile
data acquired by businesses from consumer submissions and transactions.... All
consumer data bases used for direct marketing will be consensual, based on the consumer's knowing agreement to their use and the payment of fair market value."), cited
in I-L Jeff Smith, Managing Privacy 186 n.34 (1994).
322. See Wade et al.,
supra note 301, at 952 ("Most of the cases have involved advertising, or pictures accompanying an article sold.").
323. See, eg., Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 113 P.2d 438, 448 (Or. 1941) (holding
liable a defendant who, without plaintiff's knowledge or consent, signed plaintiff's
name to a telegram urging the governor to veto a bill); Hamilton v. Lumbermen's
Mut. Casualty Co., 82 So. 2d 61, 61-62 (La. Ct. App. 1955) (finding liable a defendant
who used name of plaintiff in advertisement to find witnesses to accident).
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tort is based in property," 4 which further enhances its flexibility as a
common law doctrine, and opens up its ability to adapt to changing
standards of technology and value.325 An analysis of the right of pub-

licity, which grew out of the appropriation tort, highlights this mixed
characterization.
The right of publicity, 32 6 which developed as an offshoot of the appropriation branch of the privacy tort, provides further justification
for protecting individuals' rights in personal information. It has a distinct basis in property.32 7 The right to publicity was first explicitly recognized by Judge Jerome Frank in Haelan Laboratories,Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc.3-8 The right was endorsed by Professor Nimmer's
1954 law review article, 32 9 and acknowledged by the Supreme Court in
Zacchini v. Scripps-HowardBroadcastingCo.33° The right of publicity

324. Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren & Brandeis: Privacy, Property and Appropriation,41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 647, 649 (1991); Prosser, supra note 148, at 389. The
appropriation tort is founded on an interest that is "not so much a mental as a proprietary one, in the exclusive use of the plaintiff's name and likeness as an aspect of his
identity." Id at 389, 406.
325. Property definitions evolve to match technological growth, and to meet "new
definitions of wealth." Blackman, supra note 44, at 448. For example, with regard to
the right of publicity "the right of publicity developed for the same reasons that property rights generally are thought to develop: technological advance and social change
generated new demands, new scarcity, and new opportunities." Jesse Dukeminier &
James E. Krier, Property 68 (3d ed. 1993). As one commentator has noted:
[P]ictorial and representational graphics and celebrity endorsements increased considerably in the period 1890 to 1930.... In the process the advertising community created a legitimate market for items such as name and
likeness which had previously been out of commerce. The rapid evolution of
legal doctrine during this period demonstrates the growing acceptance [by]
judges [of] the notion that the persona might be a commodity and the individual's right to exclude others from his name and likeness was well established by the second decade of this century. In later years the further
expansion of this market encouraged judges to endow the persona with
other characteristics of property: alienability and hereditability.
George M. Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of Celebrity: Persona as Property, 51 La.
L. Rev. 443, 457 (1991).
326. "[T]he right of publicity is simply the inherent right of every human being to
control the commercial use of his or her identity." McCarthy, supra note 31, at 1704.
327. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that the appropriation tort creates "a
property right, for the exercise of which an exclusive license may be given to a third
person, which will entitle the licensee to maintain an action to protect it." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(C) cmt. a (1977).
328. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
329. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 Law & Contemp. Probs. 203
(1954).
330. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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is recognized in twenty-four states,
either by statute 331 or by incorpo332
ration into the common law.

The theoretical underpinnings of the appropriation tort and the
right of publicity support arguments that individuals have protectable
rights in personal information. In his seminal article, Professor Nimmer made clear that the right of publicity is not to be bestowed solely
upon celebrities:
It is impractical to attempt to draw a line as to which persons have
achieved the status of celebrity and which have not; it should rather
be held that every person has the property right of publicity, but
that the damages which a person may claim for infringement of the
right will depend upon the value of the publicity appropriated which
in turn will depend in great measure upon the degree of fame attained by the plaintiff. Thus, the right of publicity accorded to each
individual "may have much or little, or only
333 a nominal value," but
the right should be available to everyone.
Indeed, as another prominent commentator on the subject has stated,
"[t]he modem view of the right of publicity is that it is an inherent
right of identity possessed by everyone at birth.... If [non-celebrity]
plaintiffs only want the fair market value of their identity, then the
right of publicity should be available. ' '3 1 The majority of courts have
followed this line of reasoning and held that noncelebrities have a
right of publicity.335 McCarthy concludes that:
Each and every human being should be given control over the commercial use of his or her identity. This is because nothing is so
strongly intuited as the notion that my identity is mine-it is my
property to control as I see fit. Those who criticize this principle
must articulate some important social policy that negates this natural impulse of justice. So far, the critics have failed.336
This strong support for a right of publicity in all persons-the famous
and non-famous alike-as seen in the works of Nimmer, McCarthy
and in case law, suggests that despite decisions rendered to date, ap331. State statutes codifying the right of publicity or a form of the appropriation
tort include: Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 (West 1996); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 32-13-1-1 to -20
(Bums 1995); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 391.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1989); Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 214, § 3A (Law. Co-op. 1986); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 20-201 to -211 (1991); Nev.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 597.770 to .810 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law
§§ 50,51 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
21, § 839.1 (West 1983);
R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 9-1-28 to 28.1 (1985); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-25-1101 to -1108
(1984); Utah Code Ann. §§ 45-3-1 to -3-6 (1993); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-40 (Michie
1995); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.50(1)(b) (West 1983).
332. McCarthy, supra note 155, §§ 6.1 to 6.1-3.
333. Nimmer, supra note 329, at 217.
334. McCarthy, supra note 31, at 1710.
335. See, eg., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821,824 n.1l
(9th Cir. 1974); Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc. 235 A.2d 62, 75-76 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law.
Div. 1967); Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 260 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1984).
336. McCarthy, supra note 31, at 1711-12.
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plication of either the appropriation tort, or the right of publicity
form, is a sound method to protect against the unwanted use of individuals' identities for commercial purposes.
Further, in light of legislative problems detailed above,33 7 courts
should adopt the Reform Model of jurisprudence and extend the common law to protect individuals rights in personal information. In so
doing, these courts should not fear that they are acting excessively
activist; rather they should realize that they will be acting in accordance with the line of cases in which courts have adopted and developed the right to privacy. The next section presents a number of these
cases as examples of the steps that courts can and have taken
to move
338
forward to protect individuals against privacy violations.
D. Twentieth Century Privacy Arguments Favoring Recognition of
Rights in PersonalInformation
The common law is a flexible mechanism that can and has adapted
to technological and cultural change; accordingly, it can adapt to the
technological growth that has spawned increases in the collection and
dissemination of personal information. 339 As the right to privacy developed throughout the century, many courts adopted a Reform
Model jurisprudential posture and moved to adopt the right to privacy
through bold judicial moves that were termed by many as activist.
This section sets forth some of these courts arguments, from the persuasive arguments set out in Judge Gray's dissent in Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co.,340 to a number of subsequent privacy cases
adopting the right to privacy. As this section demonstrates, courts
which would today expand privacy doctrine to personal information
sales would not be acting beyond their competence, but rather would
join in a well-reasoned line of decisions extending privacy to protect
individuals' privacy against encroachments created by advancing
technology.
Dissenting in Roberson almost one-hundred years ago, Judge Gray
made strong arguments recognizing how the case before the court involved a right to privacy, and how recognition of that right was, in
fact, a logical extension of tort liability that the court had recognized
in the past. His observations were built upon in the majority decision
337. See supra part IV.A (detailing interest groups effects on legislative attempts to
vest individuals with protectable rights in personal information).
338. See supra part II.C (discussing failed judicial attempts at extending tort protection to unauthorized sales of personal information).
339. McCarthy, supra note 155, § 6.1[c]; see Oliver W. Holmes, The Common Law
1 (1881); Armstrong, supra note 325, at 457 (citing the evolution of legal doctrine to
protect the individual's name and likeness). For details on the manner in which technological advances have enhanced businesses's ability to gather and use personal information, and the accompanying threat individual privacy, see supra notes 48, 94, 130
and accompanying text.
340. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
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in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.,34 which was the first
decision from a state high court acknowledging the right to privacy.
Judge Gray's reflections shed light on how courts today can, and
should, view the new cases seeking redress for unauthorized sales of
personal information.
Noting that the case before him involved photography, Gray discussed technology's role in the development of the common law. He
suggested that courts should not ignore technological change, but2
rather must recognize its effects and mold the law accordingly.3
Gray's comments on the development of photographic technology
provide a useful analogy to the development of computerized information collection technology. In the same way that a camera allows
for instantaneous reproduction of a person's likeness, so too does the

process of data compilation and layering render a personality profile
of the data subject. The resulting profile is, in effect, a portrait of the
individual.
The reproduction itself would not be impossible without technology; but just as painting a portrait would involve a major investment
of time and resources, the act of compiling and layering mass quantities of personal information about people would be significantly more
time consuming without computer technology.34 3 Moreover, mere
possession of the information could not be actionable, as Judge Gray
noted. Rather, the commercial dissemination of this information-of
this "informational portrait"-is what interferes with the individual's
ownership rights and warrants legal protection. Judge Gray's statement regarding photographic likenesses is applicable to personality
profiles:
But if it is to be permitted that the portraiture may be put to commercial or other uses for gain by the publication of prints therefrom,
then an act of invasion of the individual's privacy results, possibly

more formidable and more painful in its consequences than an actual bodily assault might be.?

Similarly, if the personality profile is put to commercial use without
the consent of the subject, an invasion of privacy results. Although
Gray spoke of an invasion of privacy, his general discussion emphasized that any privacy rights are based on property rights.3 5 Gray
focused on the nature of property rights, stressing that "property" is
341. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
342. 64 N.E. at 449.
343. For instance, a marketer could theoretically follow a subject around all the

time, all day, and record the stores that person shops in, the car he drives, the neighborhood he lives in, the clothes he wears, etc. Clearly, however, the effort involved in
such a process would be prohibitively expensive.

344. 1&
345. 1d ("I think that this plaintiff has the same right of property in the right to be
protected against the use of her face for defendant's commercial purposes as she
would have if they were publishing her literary compositions.").
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not the object that is owned, but rather a right of the owner as to that
object:
Property is not, necessarily, the thing itself which is owned; it is the
right of the owner in relation to it. The right to be protected in
one's possession of a thing or in one's privilege, belonging to him as
an individual, or secured to him as a member of the commonwealth,
is property, and as such entitled to the protection of the law. The
protective power of equity is not exercised upon the tangible thing,
but upon the right to enjoy it; and so it is called forth for the protection of the right to that which is one's exclusive possession as a
property right. 46
These arguments laid the foundation for the growth of common law
privacy throughout the twentieth century.
Judge Gray was not alone in his belief that the common law had
ample flexibility to accommodate development of a right to privacy.
The Hawaii Supreme Court had no precedent to rely upon when it
first recognized the right to privacy." Referring to the vitality of the
common law, the court stated that "the absence of precedent is a feeble argument." 8 The Court further noted that common law system
would have withered centuries ago had it lacked the ability to expand
and adapt to the social, economic, and political changes inherent in a
vibrant human society. 349 The court also answered the criticism that
recognizing the tort would lead to a flood of litigation, noting that
such arguments accompany all innovations in the law. °
In McCormack v. Oklahoma Publishing Company,351 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that "[t]he common law is not static,
but is a dynamic and growing thing and its rules arise from the application of reason to the changing conditions ....Flexibility and capac''352
ity for growth and adaptation is its peculiar boast and excellence.

As to whether the legislature is better suited to identify such a right,
the court remarked that "[i]t is unnecessary for the Legislature ' to
en'353
act a law to create this tort in abrogation of the common law.

It

noted that the common law was more than the "ancient unwritten law
of England," but included the body of law created and embodied in
the decisions of the state's courts.354 The Connecticut Supreme Court
established a right to privacy, it held specifically that recognition of
the right was properly a matter for judicial consideration.355
346. Id.
347. Fergerstrom v. Hawaii Ocean View Estates, 441 P.2d 141, 143 (Haw. 1968).
348. Id.

349. Id.
350. Id. at 143-44.

351. 613 P.2d 737 (Okla. 1980).
352. Id at 740 (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884)).

353. Id
354. Id.

355. Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican Am., Inc., 448 A.2d 1317, 1328 (Conn.
1982).
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Similarly, in Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co.,356 the Supreme Court of
Oregon recognized the appropriation branch of the right to privacy.
In answering the claim that no precedent supported the decision, the
court argued that "natural justice and the needs of the society in
which we live should prevail over objections based upon the novelty
of the asserted cause of action." 3" It embraced the ability of courts to
make law "without waiting on the legislature," asserting that some of
the best law is that made by judges.3 s The court correctly recognized
that courts cannot, as Sir Frederick Pollock stated, "lay down any rule
they choose."35 9 They must "supplement and enlarge the law as they
find it, or rather they must do so from time to time, as the novelty of
questions coming before'36them
may require; but they must not reverse
0
what has been settled.
Indeed, in the present case the courts today will follow the path set
forth by Pollock and Holmes and practiced by the courts listed above;
they will "supplement and enlarge" an already vibrant body of law to
address the "novel" questions that are coming before them in light of
technological development, and "the needs of the society in which we
live."
CONCLUSION

Recent evidence indicates that individuals have mounting concerns
over unauthorized dissemination of personal information. In light of
these concerns, commentators have suggested legislative solutions to
this problem, and seek legislative enactments that would vest individuals with protectable rights in personal information. Despite the theoretical appeal of such solutions, however, this Note has suggested that
because of weaknesses in legislative processes, courts can, and in fact
should, advance tort-based consideration of the issue, to grant individuals privacy rights in personal information.
Disproportionate interest-group pressure distorts the legislative
process and gives courts the responsibility to address the personal information issue on its merits, so as to weaken the legislative inertia
amassed against meaningful consideration of proposals to grant individuals rights in personal information. This jurisprudential model can
liberate the lawmaking capabilities of our republican government
without providing judges with unrestrained power, because any courtcreated rule is always subject to review, and even veto, by the
legislature.
356. 113 P.2d 438 (Or. 1941).

357. Id. at 447.
358. Id359. Id.

360. Id. (quoting Sir Frederick Pollock, The Expansion of the Common Law 49
(Rothman Reprints 1974) (1904)).

